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THE DEVELOPMENT OF NONPROFIT 
CORPORATION LAW AND AN AGENDA FOR 
REFORM 
by 
James J. Fishman* 
Americans of all ages, all conditions, and all dispositions con- 
stantly form associations. They have not only commercial and 
manufacturing companies, in which all take part, but associa- 
tions of a thousand other kinds, religious, moral, serious, fu- 
tile, general or restricted, enormous or diminutive. The Amer- 
icans make associations to give entertainments, to found 
seminaries, to build inns, to construct churches, to diffuse 
books, to send missionaries to the antipodes; in this manner 
they found hospitals, prisons, and schools. If it is proposed to 
inculcate some truth or to foster some feeling by the encour- 
agement of a great example, they form a society. Wherever at  
the head of some new undertaking you see the government in 
France, or a man of rank in England, in the United States 
you will be sure to find an association. 
Alexis DeTocquevillel 
Since DeTocqueville's observation, the nonprofit2 sector has con- 
tinued in importance. Today, its size and diversity are staggering. 
It is difficult to accurately estimate the number of nonprofit orga- 
* Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. A.B. 1964, A.M. 1965, University of 
Pennsylvania; J.D. 1968, Ph.D. 1979, New York University. 
2 A. DETOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 106 (P. Bradley ed. 1966). 
Charitable organizations are sometimes referred to as "not-for-profit." See N.Y. NOT- 
FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1984-85). The drafters of the New York 
Statute used the term "not-for-profit" to indicate the true character of this type of corpora- 
tion as being one organized not-for-profit but which could make a profit within the provi- 
sions of the statute. Revisers' Comment 1 101,14th Interim Report, Legis. Doc. No. 11 a t  97 
(1970). Explanatory memorandum, January 13,1969 in 13th Interim Report, Legis. Doc. 83 
a t  48 (1969). Thus, the Not-for-Profit Corporation Law allows the creation of a legal capa- 
city to form a not-for-profit corporation for a business, though not for a profit purpose. 
Note, New York's Not-for-Pr4t Corporation Law, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761, 774 (1972). We 
consider "not-for-profit" as interchangeable with nonprofit and use the shorter term 
throughout this article. 
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nizations in the United  state^.^ They range in size from organiza- 
tions with billions of dollars of assets, such as foundations and uni- 
versities, to groups with virtually no resources, such as three- 
person dance companies or Little Leagues? 
The rapid increase in the number and aggregate wealth of chari- 
table organizations, particularly of those that take the form of non- 
profit corporations, has taken the law by surpri~e.~ There has been 
no coherent development of the law of nonprofit organizations. 
Courts and commentators are still developing fundamental legal 
principles and attempting to achieve agreement as to what non- 
profit organizations are and how they should be categorized. 
This article examines the development of the law of "charitable 
corporations" and attempts to explain why the charitable corpora- 
tion rather than the charitable trust became the predominant or- 
ganizational form for charitable and benevolent activities in the 
United States. It then discusses some of the inconsistencies of non- 
Hard data is difficult to find. The Internal Revenue Service reported 851,012 active 
nonprofits in 1981, 1981 IRS ANN. REP. 54, Table 20, but not all nonprofits register or file 
with the Service as provided by law. In New York, nonprofits are not separated from busi- 
ness corporations on the Secretary of State's lists. Attorney General Robert Abrams reports 
that only 21,000 organizations register and report, as required, with the New York State 
Law Department. Abrams, Regulating Chanty-The State's Role, 35 Rec. 481,483 (1980). 
In California in 1978 there were an estimated 62,000 nonprofit corporations. Nida, Member- 
ship Lists: Balancing The Interests Between Use and Abuse, 13 U.SYL. REV. 797 (1979). 
For a state by state estimate of members of nonprofit organizations, see H. OLECK, NON- 
PROFIT CORPORATIONS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND ASSOCIATIONS 11-14 (4th ed. 1980). 
'' No single institution is typical of the nonprofit sector. I t  is dominated in size by 
health and education activities. E. GINZBURG, D. HIESTAND & B. REUBENS, THE PLURALISTIC 
ECONOMY 21 (1965). In 1980 nonprofits spent $219 biiion dollars, a sum greater than the 
combined sales of Chrysler, Ford, and General Motors that year, and employed 5.6 million 
people. The nonprofit sector accounts for nearly five percent of the gross national product. 
Rudney, A Quantitative Profile of the Nonprofit Sector, (Yale Program on Nonprofit Orga- 
nizations, working Paper No. 40, 3, November 1981). Americans donate approximately $45 
b i i o n  to charity, deducting approximately $32 billion from their taxable incomes. These 
deductions reduce Federal tax revenues by about $11 billion. Protecting Charity in Tax 
Reform, New York Times, Mar. 11, 1985, a t  A18, col. 1. There are an estimated 23,000 
grant-making private foundations in the United States, representing about $41.4 billion in 
assets. Approximately 15% of the foundations have assets of $1 million or more. B. HOPKINS, 
THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 378 (1983). 
Karst, The Eficiency of the Charitabie Dollac An Unfulfilled State Responsibility, 
73 HARV. L. REV. 433,435 (1960); W. CARY & C. BRIGHT, THE LAW AND LORE OF ENDOWMENT 
FUNDS 14 (Report to the Ford Foundation, 1969). 
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profit corporation law and provides an agenda for future reform. 
There is no uniform or standard definition for a nonprofit organ- 
ization. We use the term "nonprofit" to refer to an organization 
that is barred from distributing profits or net earnings to individu- 
als who exercise control over it, such as directors, officers, or mem- 
b e r ~ . ~  One unifying definitional principle is the prohibition against 
private inurement by individuals who exercise control over the or- 
ganization. That is, individuals may not by reason of their position 
acquire any of an organization's funds except as reasonable com- 
pensation for goods and services.? 
The predominance of the nonprofit corporation in the United 
States as the organizational form for charitable activities and the 
lack of a coherent law of nonprofit corporations have been due to 
the special circumstances of the New World, the vagaries of histor- 
ical scholarship, the rapid growth of the charitable sector, and in- 
creasing similarities in size, structure, and management between 
charitable organizations and business ~orporations.~ Prior to this 
century the traditional common law instrument for the legal recog- 
nition of charitable activities was the charitable trust, not the 
charitable ~orporation.~ 
Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 497,501 (1981) 
[hereinafter cited as Hansmann, Reforming]; Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enter- 
prise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 838 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Hansmann, Role]. 
See I.R.C. 8 501(c)(3)(1984); Treas. Reg. 5 1.501(~)(3)-l(c)(2) (1976). 
See generally Note, The Charitable Corporation, 64 HARV. L. REV. 1168 (1951). 
A trust is a relationship between parties with respect to property in which one party 
has responsibility of management of the property as a fiduciary for the benefit of the other. 
RESTATE~~ENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS g 2 (1959) [hereinafter cited as RESTATE~~ENT]; G.G. Bo- 
GERT & G.T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES g 1(rev. 2d ed. 1979); 1 A. SCOTT, 
THE LAW OF TRUSTS $8 2-28 (3rd ed. 1967). A trustee is the party with the fiduciary respon- 
sibility of management who holds legal title to the property in trust. The party for whose 
benefit property is held is called the beneficiary or cestui que. The beneficiary holds equita- 
ble title to property in trust. RESTATEMENT, supra, a t  8 3; G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, 
supra, a t  8 1; A. SCOTT, supra, a t  8 3.2. The trustee is answerable to the beneficiary for 
breach of duties imposed by law. In a private trust, beneficiaries are identifiable individuals, 
a characteristic essential for the trust's validity. RESTATEMENT, supra, a t  5 122; G.G. BOGERT 
& G.T. BOGERT, supra, a t  § 161; 2 A. SCOTT, supra a t  3 112. 
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A. Charitable Trusts as Philanthropic Vehicles 
Charitable trusts were enforced in England before the seven- 
teenth centfiry.1° Since the Reformation, the trust has been the 
predominant form of organization for English charitable activities. 
It remains so today.ll 
There has been little reason for English charitable entities to use 
the corporate form of organization, although charitable organiza- 
tions have been able to incorporate since 1597.12 The Companies 
Act of 1867lS permitted general incorporation for nonpecuniary 
ends, but since the Crown was the source of power to create corpo- 
rations, the creation of a charitable trust was afforded greater free- 
dom. The managers of an English charity organized in the corpo- 
rate form were not relieved of supervisory responsibility by the 
charity commissioners or by the courts.14 Thus, the trust form con- 
tinued to be preferred. 
Unlike the law of charitable trusts and nonprofit corporation law 
as it developed in the United States, English law as it later evolved 
made no distinction as to the nature of the ownership of property 
A charitable trust is one that serves several recognized charitable purposes. The benefi- 
ciaries need not be identifiable individuals. Legal title is in the trustee; equitable title lies 
with the public. The duty of the trustee is owed to the public rather than to a specific 
beneficiary. RESTATEMENT $0 348,364,368-74,379; G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, supra, a t  
362; 4 A. Scorn, supra, a t  §$ 348, 364, 368-74, 379. Unlike a private trust, the charitable 
trust has perpetual existence. RESTATEMENT § 365; G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, surpa, a t  § 
361. Typically, the attorney general or a party who benefits specifically are the only persons 
with standing to enforce the tmtee's responsibilities. RESTATEMENT, supra a t  $ 391; G.G. 
BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, supra, a t  411; 4 A. S c m ,  supra, a t  391. 
lo 4 A. Scorn, supra note 9, a t  348.2; G. JONES, HISTORY OF THE LAW OF CHARITY, 
1532-1827, a t  3-9 (1969). 
M. FREMONT-SMITH, FOUNDATIONS AND GOVERNMENT 18-27 (1965). In the overdrawn 
words of Maitland: 
The idea of a trust is so familiar to us all that we never wonder a t  it. And yet 
surely we ought to wonder. If we were asked what was the greatest and most dis- 
tinctive achievement performed by Englishmen in the field of jurisprudence I can- 
not think that we could have any better answer to give than this, namely, the 
development from century to century of the trust idea. 
3 MAITLAND, COLLECTED PAPERS .271-72 (1911). 
l2 39 Eliz. 1 ch. 5 (1597). 
l3 Companies Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. ch. 131. 
" M. F'REMONT-SMITH, supra note 11, a t  35. 
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between a corporation and a trust.16 For instance, contrary to 
American developments, the standards of care and loyalty for di- 
rectors of English charitable organizations (are similar whether the 
corporate or trust form is adopted.le Legal distinctions were not 
made between charitable trusts and charitable corporations on the 
basis of their forms of organization. Thus, one can speak of a uni- 
fied law of charities in England in contrast to the United States.17 
The charitable trust has had a more checkered and uncertain ca- 
reer in this country.18 Ironically, the growth of the nonprofit corpo- 
ration in the United States was assisted by the English Statute of 
Charitable Uses of 1601, legislation that provided machinery for 
the enforcement of charitable trusts.l9 
B. Philanthropy in the New World 
An attitude favorable to philanthropy existed from the begin- 
ning of settlement in the new world. Colonists were accustomed to 
the traditional support and enforcement of charities in England. 
Churches, which exerted a significant influence within colonial so- 
ciety, were favorably disposed to philanthropic endeavors.20 De- 
l6 Id.; 0. TUDOR, TUDOR ON CHARITIES 194 (H. Carter & F. Cranshaw, 5th ed. 1929). 
"Eleemosynary corporations hold their property upon charitable trusts, and are therefore 
subject to the jurisdiction of the court like all trustees, corporate or incorporate, lay or 
ecclesiastical." 
Ie Charities Act, 1960, 8 & 9 Eliz. 2 ch. 58, 8 46 says: " '[Tlrusts', in relation to a 
charity, means the provisions establishing i t  as a charity and regulating its purposes and 
administration, whether those provisions take effect by way of trust or not, and in relation 
to other institutions, has a corresponding meaning." 
l7 M. FRELIONT-SMITH, supra note 11, a t  36. 
l8 L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 223 (1973). 
lo 43 Eliz. I, ch. 4 (1601). The statute conferred authority upon the Chancellor to ap- 
point commissioners from time to time to inquire into any abuses of charitable bequests or 
donations. The commissioners could impanel juries, summon and hear witnesses, and make 
decrees. Persons aggrieved by commissioners' decrees could appeal to the chancellor. The 
statute provided for a new remedy for the enforcement of charitable trusts but did not 
displace the already existing remedy of an original complaint in Chancery, a fact which was 
to have a great impact in the United States. The new procedure was little employed after a 
period of time and, the importance of the law of charitable trusts lies in the preamble of the 
statute, which contains an enumeration of charitable purposes, 4 A. Scorn, supra note 9, a t  
$§ 348.2, 368.1. 
Note, The Enforcement of Charitable Trusts in America: A History of Evolving So- 
cial Attitudes, 54 VA. L. REV. 436,440 (1968). Georgia was established as a charitable corpo- 
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spite disagreement on other matters the various churches in the 
colonies "all shared the traditional Protestant emphasis upon the 
individual's responsibility for the spiritual material welfare of the 
community, and accordingly supported a variety of charitable in- 
st i tution~."~~ The immediate stimulus for this benevolent atmo- 
sphere was the pressing need for the establishment of public facili- 
ties such as hospitals, churches, and schools:22 
[The colonists] did not debate the question of public versus 
private responsibility . . . public and private philanthropy 
were so completely intertwined as to become almost indistin- 
guishable. The law itself reflected a pragmatic approach to 
the solving of social problems through philanthropy. Colonial 
assemblies went out of their way to remove obstacles in the 
way of charities. The courts valuing social betterment above 
legal technicalities, asserted a permissive charity doctrine 
that supported donors' benevolent intentions, even when the 
formulation of their plans was clearly imper fe~ t .~~  
Philanthropic approaches in Colonial America were not uniform.24 
From the beginning, public and private philanthropy coexisted. In 
Boston and other Massachusetts towns, public spending for pov- 
erty relief combined with private contributions and lega~ies.2~ The 
typical vehicle for private philanthropic efforts was the English 
charitable use, which enjoyed universal appr0val.2~ 
ration for the English poor. The grandiose scheme concocted by English philanthropists wns 
a failure and the charter of the corporation was returned to the crown in 1752. See D. BOOR- 
STEIN, THE AMERICANS: THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE 71-95 (1958). 
a' H. MILLER, THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN PHILANTHROPY 1776-1844, a t  x 
(1961). 
Note, supra note 20, a t  440; M. F'REMONT-SMITH, supra note 11, a t  36. 
H. MILLER, supra note 21, a t  xi. For a discussion of Colonial statutes, see Note, 
supra note 20, a t  440-41; H. WLER, supra note 21, a t  4-8. 
Wyllie, The Search for a n  American Law of Charity, 1776-1844, 46 MISS. VALLEY 
HIST. REV. 203, 204 (1959). 
Id. a t  204-07. As early as 1658 individuals left legacies for charitable purposes, partic- 
ularly for the relief of the poor. C. BRIDENBAUGH, CITIES IN THE WILDERNESS 81 (1938). 
26 Wyllie, supra note 24, a t  204-07. In the words of Horace Binney, counsel to the es-, 
tate of Stephen Giard  in Vidal v. Giard's Executors, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 127, 154 (1844), 
"There was probably never a colony of English origin, that did not regard [charitable orga- 
nizations] as both morally and legally good, and hold them to be matters of conscientious 
duty as well as of public policy." 
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In the immediate post-Revolutionary period, the favorable atti- 
tude toward charity continued. The law relating to charities re- 
flected the general uncertainty and transition that characterized all 
American law in the post-Revolutionary period.27 Each state uti- 
lized an approach reflective of its local needs and customs. Most 
state constitutions were silent about philanthr~phy.~~ The Massa- 
chusetts constitution of 1780, however, provided: "It shall be the 
duty of legislatures and magistrates, in all futwe periods of this 
Commonwealth . . . to countenance and inculcate the principles of 
humanity and general benevolence, public and private charity . . . 
and all social affections, and generous sentiments amoung the 
people."20 
Pennsylvania, Vermont, and New Hampshire also gave constitu- 
tional protection to charities.30 Other states passed statutes facili- 
tating and reaffirming the benefits of charities to the ~omrnunity.~~ 
In part, the retention of prior statutes and practices resulted from 
the general continuation of English law and precedent in the first 
years following Independen~e.~~ 
H. MILLER, supra note 21, a t  15. Cf. W. NELSON, A~IERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON 
LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON ~ ~ A S S A C H U S ~ S  SOCIETY 1760-1830, a t  68 (1975). In 
the words of Justice Samuel Chase in a circuit court opinion: 
When the American Colonies were first settled by our ancestors . . . they brought 
hither, as a birth-right and inheritance, so much of the common law, as was appli- 
cable to their local situation, and change of circumstances. But each colony judged 
for itself, what parts of the common law were applicable to its new conditions; and 
in various modes, by Legislative acts, by Judicial decision, or by constant usage, 
adopted some parts, and rejected others. 
U.S. v. Worrall, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 384, 394 (C.C. Pa. 1798). 
H. MILLER, supra note 21, a t  15. 
3 I?. THORPE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND 
OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE 
F O R ~ ~ I N G  THE UNITED STATES OF A~IERICA 1907-08 (1909). 
H. MILLER, supra note 21, a t  9-10; Note, supra note 20, a t  441; N.H. Comt. pt. 2 
(1784) reprinted in 4 F. THORPE, supra note 29, a t  2467-68; Pa. Comt. 1 45 (1776) re- 
printed in 5 F. THORPE, supra note 29, a t  3091; Vt. Comt., ch. 2 $ 41 (1977) reprinted in 6 
I?. THORPE, supra note 29, a t  3748. 
31 H. MILLER, supra note 21, a t  16-18; Note, supra note 20, a t  441-42. 
E. BROWN, BRITISH STATUTES IN AMERICAN LAW 1776-1836, a t  24-26 (1964). 
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C. The Charitable Trust in the United States 
At the end of the eighteenth century, the rise of political and 
cultural nationalism and a belief that the law should be a reflection 
of the present rather than constricted by the dead hand of prece- 
dent joined with a broad reaction against all things British. This 
led to the repeal of many English statutes.33 The state of Virginia 
is illustrative. Virginia retained all British statutes upon Indepen- 
dence, but completely repealed them in 1792.34 This general repeal 
included the Statute of Charitable Uses of 1601. Emerging nation- 
alism, combined with the specifics of Virginia colonial history and 
political efforts to disestablish the Anglican Church, led to a re- 
strictive attitude toward char i t i e~ .~~  The repeal of English statutes 
had an even greater impact on the use of the charitable trust, for 
lawyers argued that the repeal of the Statute of Charitable Uses 
meant that charitable trusts could not be su~ t a ined .~~  
Permissive charitable practices were still retained in most states, 
particularly in the Northeast, which had little difficulty accepting 
the English law of charitable trusts and upholding its validity. But 
seven states, including Virginia, refused to uphold the validity of 
charitable trusts. Courts in these jurisdictions concluded that the 
Statute of Charitable Uses was not in force in the state because a 
statute so provided, because it was inapplicable to American condi- 
tion, or because it was omitted from the enumeration of English 
statutes which were accepted by the new state.37 
The legal rationale behind the unenforceability of charitable 
trusts was the mistaken belief that the equity powers for such en- 
forcement derived solely from the Statute of Charitable Uses and 
Id. at 43,104,123; H. MILLER, supra note 21, at 10-15; Note, supra note 20, at 441. 
=' 9 HENING'S TATUTES AT LARGE 127 (W. Hening, ed., 1821). See also E. BROWN, supra 
note 32, at 120-28; Wyllie, supra note 24, at 206; C. ZOLLMAN, THE A~~ERICAN L W OF CHAR- 
ITY 21 (1924). 
30 H. MILLER, supra note 21, at 19-20; Wyllie, supra note 24, at 206-07; Note, supra 
note 20, at 442. 
Wyllie, supra note 24, at 206. 
4 A. Scorn, supra note 9, at $ 348.3. See generally Note, supra note 8, at 1168 
(describing special conditions present in the "New World"). The states were Maryland, 
Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. 
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did not exist at common law. It was assumed that the power of 
enforcement was not exercised by Chancellors prior to 1601.38 If 
the Statute of Charitable Uses was not carried over to American 
jurisdictions, there could be no common law precedent for uphold- 
ing charitable trusts. 
The invalidity of the charitable trust as a method of philan- 
thropic disposition because of the lack of a common law precedent 
was upheld in Trustees of Philadelphia Baptist Association v. 
Hart's  executor^.^^ The testator, Silas Hart, had given a charitable 
disposition to the Philadelphia Baptist Association, an unincorpo- 
rated association, for the purpose of educating youths for the Bap- 
tist ministry. The testator's executors refused to deliver the be- 
quest, so the Association brought suit in a Virginia Court of 
Chancery. The specific legal issue was whether charitable trusts 
should be subject to the general rule invalidating private trusts 
where there was no specific beneficiary.qO 
In the course of the decision the United States Supreme Court 
attempted to determine whether the power to enforce charitable 
The jurisdiction of English courts over trusts rests upon their ordinary jurisdiction 
over trusts, the prerogative of the crown, and the Statute of Charitable Uses. C. ZOLLMAN, 
supra note 34, a t  8. In the United States, it was mistakenly assumed that equity's jurisdic- 
tion over charitable trusts was created by the Statute of Charitable Uses. If that statute was 
repealed, there being no royal prerogative, there was no way to enforce attempted creations 
of charitable trusts. Originally charitable trusts were enforced by ecclesiastical courts, but 
by the beginning of the fifteenth century, complaints were heard about ecclesiastical justice 
and complainants turned to the Chancellor for help in enforcing charitable legacies. His 
jurisdiction over the enforcement of trusts came later. At this time, the bills were brought 
by individuals. The attorney general did not bring an information in equity on behalf of the 
crown until some time later. G. JONES, supra note 10, a t  5-8. 
17 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 1 (1819). 
'O Id. a t  43. A private trust is invalid unless there is a beneficiary who is definitely 
ascertained a t  the time of the creation of the trust or definitely ascertainable within the 
period of the rule against perpetuities. RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, a t  3 112. In the case of a 
charitable trust, the persons who are to receive benefits need not be designated since the 
beneficial interest is not given to individual beneficiaries, but the property is devoted to the . 
accomplishment of purposes beneficial to the community. RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, a t  3 
364. 
A charitable trust is enforceable a t  the suit of the Attorney General. RESTATEMENT, supra 
note 9, a t  § 391. 
The justification for the private trust rule is to enable someone to have standing to en- 
force the trust. No one other than a beneficiary or one suing on the beneficiary's behalf can 
maintain a suit against the trustee to enforce the trust. 4 A Scorn, supra note 9, a t  3 200. 
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trusts stemmed from common law. The Calendars of the Proceed- 
ings on Chancery, a compilation of cases from the time of Eliza- 
beth I, had been published in England and conclusively showed 
that charitable trusts had been upheld prior to the Statute of 
Charitable Uses. However, these early Chancery reports were not 
yet available in the United States?' Because of their unavailabil- 
ity, the Court was unable to find evidence of the early Chancery 
practice, and held that the Chancellor's power was derived solely 
from the Statute of Charitable U~es .4~ Chief Justice Marshall con- 
cluded that the enforcement power was an extraordinary power 
rather than one inherent in the Chancellor's equity jurisdiction. 
Therefore, the power to enforce a charitable trust depended upon 
whether the Statute of Charitable Uses or similar law was in force 
in the state where a settlor created a trust!3 Since Virginia had 
repealed all English statutes, the trust was not exempt from the 
rule requiring a definite beneficiary. 
It has been suggested that the Hart decision was based not only 
upon historical ignorance but was part of the ongoing anti-charity- 
anti-clerical atmosphere of the period!' Even as wise a jurist as 
Justice Joseph Story supported mortmain statutes to check clerical 
power and believed that charities, religious or otherwise, trampled 
individual rights by depriving future heirs of property to which 
they were entitled?6 
Chancellor Kent, among others, severely criticized the Hart re- 
~ u l t . 4 ~  Hart was judicially undermined in a United States circuit 
court of appeals opinion, Magill v. Brown,q7 written by United 
41 A schedule of cases from Chancery Proceedings before 1601 is listed in the argument 
of Horace Binney, counsel for Girard's Executors, in Vidal v. Girard's Executors, 43 U.S. (2 
HOW.) 127, 154-61 (1844). 
Trustees of Philadelphia Baptist Association v. Hart's Executors, 17 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 
1, 38-39 (1819). 
Id. a t  47, 49. 
44 Note, supra note 20, a t  443-44. 
4n H. MILLER, supra note 21, a t  43-44. Story outlined this argument anonymously in 
the "notes" to volume four of Wheaton's Reports in which Hart appeared. Id. 
4 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *286-87 (1836); Wyllie, supra note 24, 
a t  211. 
47 16 F. Cas. 408 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1833) (No. 8954). See also Wyllie, supra note 24, a t  211- 
20. Other decisions ignored or criticized Hart. See McCartee v. Orphan Asylum Society, 9 
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States Supreme Court Justice Henry Baldwin. Using the Calen- 
dars of the Proceedings in Chancery, which were first published in 
the United States in 1827, Baldwin conclusivelydemonstrated that 
charitable trusts had been upheld by equity courts before 1601. 
The Supreme Court corrected its historical error in Vidal u. 
Girard's E ~ e c u t o r . ~ ~  The financier Stephen Girard bequeathed 
seven million dollars to fund a school for "poor, white, male or- 
phans" in Philadelphia. Girard's heirs sought to have the trust set 
aside under Hart on grounds that it was invalid for lack of a defi- 
nite benefi~iary.~~ The issue was whether courts had the inherent 
power to administer charitable trusts without a specialized author- 
izing statute. Justice Story distinguished Hart from Vidal on 
three grounds: 1) Virginia had expressly abolished the Statute of 
Charitable Uses while Pennsylvania had not; 2) the trustees in 
Hart were an unincorporated association which had no legal capac- 
ity to take and hold donations for purposes of trust; and 3) the 
recent historical information available proved the existence of 
charitable trusts at common law.6o 
Despite the Vidal decision, several states, principally in the 
South, still refused to enforce charitable trusts.61 Other states con- 
strued their statutes permitting trusts restrictively. For instance, 
in 1829 the New York legislature in a statutory revision of all its 
laws codified the law of uses and trusts. The new statute permitted 
four types of trusts, but did not mention the charitable kind.62 
Throughout the nineteenth century, New York Courts interpreted 
the statute strictly, which meant in practice that a testator could 
not give his property to a charitable trust in a manner that would 
withstand judicial scrutiny.63 
Cow. 437 (N.Y. 1827); Burr v. Smith, 7 Vt. 241 (1835). 
43 U.S. (2 How.) 127 (1844). 
48 Id. a t  186. Stephen Giard  should be considered the patron saint of American law- 
yers, for his will has generated so much litigation that he possibly has helped more attorneys 
than orphans. See Tashjian, Future of Charitable Trusts, 99 TR & EST. 1090 (1960) 
(description of the litigation involving Girard's will). 
'O Vidal, 43 U.S. (2 How.) a t  191-93, 196. 
O1 Note, supra note 8, a t  14. 
Amendatory Act of 1830, ch. 320, 1830 N.Y. Laws 386-87. 
See Bascom v. Albertaon, 34 N.Y. 584,620 (1866) (overruling W i a m s  v. Williams, 8 
N.Y. 525 (1853) (enactment of the Revised Statutes did not invalidate bequests in trusts for 
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For much of the nineteenth century the use of the charitable 
trust suffered from widespread fear of the dead hand, particularly 
the dead hand of the from strict construction of trust 
statutes, and from judicial unwillingness to recognize the charita- 
ble trust. The primary argument brought against the charitable 
trust in some jurisdictions was that adequate control over the trus- 
tee was lacking because of the absence of a definite cestui to initi- 
ate equitable proceedings against the trustee in the event of his or 
her deviation from the original intent of the donor. Thus, in Bas- 
corn v. Albertson the New York Court of Appeals said public policy 
required that "funds irrevocably dedicated to purposes of charity, 
are to be administered through agencies and organizations sanc- 
tioned by legislative authority, and not by the intervention of pri- 
vate  trustee^."^^ 
Even jurisdictions hostile to the charitable trust did not pre- 
clude donations to charities. To evade the prohibition of strict con- 
struction against charitable trusts, a donor would make the gift or 
bequest directly to a charitable corporation for one or more of its 
corporate p ~ r p o s e s . ~ ~  In New York, before the passage of the 
Tilden Act6' in 1893, the only way a testator could ensure that a 
charitable gift would be upheld was to donate it to a charitable 
corporation of limited duration.68 
charitable purposes)); Owens v. Missionary Society, 14 N.Y. 380,385 (1856); Yates v. Yates, 
9 Barb. 324, 332-33 (N.Y. 1850); Scott, Charitable Trusts in New York, 26 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
251, 254-56 (1951); Note, supra note 8, a t  1172. 
L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 18, a t  370. 
Bascorn, 34 N.Y. 584, 620-21 (1866). 
Oe Art Students' League v. Hikley, 31 F. 2d 469, 476-78 (D. Md. 1929); Holmes v. 
Mead, 52 N.Y. 332, 339 (1873); Roy's Executors v. Rowzie, 66 Va. (25 Gratt.) 599, 608 
(1874); Note, supra note 8, at  1169-72. 
" 1893 N.Y. Laws 701. The Act resulted from the failure of Samuel J. Tilden's bequest 
of four million dollars to fund a free public library in New York City. See Tilden v. Green, 
130 N.Y. 29, 28 N.E. 880 (1891); Scott, supra note 53, a t  257-58; Note, supra note 20, a t  
456-57. 
6B Note, supra note 8, a t  1172. See also Holmes v. Mead, 52 N.Y. 332, 339 (1873); 
Wetmore v. Parker, 52 N.Y. 450, 453 (1873)(A gift of property by bequest to a charitable 
corporation "does not create a trust in any such sense, as that term is applied to property. 
The corporation uses the property, in accordance with the law of its creation, for its pur- 
poses; and the dictation of the manner of its use, within the law by the donor, does not 
affect its ownership or make i t  a trustee. A person may transform himself into a trustee for 
another, but he cannot be a trustee for himself."). 
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To sustain a charitable bequest in the nineteenth century in 
states such as New York, courts had to find an intent to make an 
absolute gift to the specific corporation for its proper purposes, 
rather than an attempt to create a trust for indefinite and uncer- 
tain benefi~iaries.~~ To avoid a forfeiture of a testator's intent, 
courts engaged in the most tortuous reasoning to find that an abso- 
lute gift was intended to the corporation, even when the instru- 
ment used such precise terminology as: "I give, devise and be- 
queath . . . to . . . in trust. . . . ,780 
Opposition to charitable trusts weakened by the beginning of the 
twentieth century. By then, however, the charitable corporation 
had become an increasingly important form for philanthropic ac- 
tivities. The use of the business corporation form of organization in 
America and judicial uncertainty toward the charitable trust made 
the use of the charitable corporation for all types of charitable ac- 
tivities inevitably greater in America than in England.61 
D. The Origins of the Charitable Corporation 
The corporate form dates from the time of Edward I11 in the 
fourteenth century when chartered ecclesiastical and governmental 
associations came to be regarded as bodies.e2 Prior to the fifteenth 
Note, supra note 8, a t  1169. 
B0 Art Students' League v. Hinkley, 31 F.2d 469, 470 (D. Md. 1929). Courts justified 
this result by a change in the definition of the word "trust" when i t  related to a charitable 
purpose within the functions of a charitable corporation. The word "trust" refers to proper 
use of the property or bequest by the corporation given the purposes in the corporate char- 
ter. Id. a t  476-77. See akro Domestic & Foreign Missionary Society v. Gaither, 62 F. 422 (D. 
Md. 1894): 
It would seem, therefore, that money given to the corporation as this legacy was is 
not to be held by i t  upon any trust, but is to be expended by it in the missionary 
work which i t  carries on within the United States. It carries on its missions and 
missionary works through the instrumentality of boards, committees, treasurers, 
bishops, clergymen, and agents; being a corporation, it can act only through its 
officers and agents, but the work is its own immediate and special work. This is 
not a case in which there is a trust or trustee or cestui que trust. It is a direct 
expenditure by a corporation for the very object for which i t  was created. 
Gaither, 62 F. a t  426 
M. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 11, a t  40. 
3 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 476-479 (5th ed. 1942). 
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century, gifts to charities were protected.s3 
Certain corporate principles such as the creation of the corpo- 
rate person, the authority of the incorporators, the method of 
forming corporations, the powers belonging to the incorporators, 
and the powers, capabilities, and liabilities of corporations, were 
settled by the sixteenth century.64 The earliest corporate enabling 
legislation was passed in 1596 to encourage charitable distributions 
for the establishment of hospitals, prisons, and other relief for the 
poor by eliminating charges for incorporation and the necessity of 
the sovereign's consent.66 
E. The Charitable Corporation in Colonial America 
As early as the seventeenth century the corporation was used in 
the New World as an organizational form for charitable activities. 
According to one commentator, "[tlhe law of corporations was the 
law of [colonists'] being for the four original New England colonies. 
. . . It governed all the relations of life."66 At the least, the prac- 
tice of executive or legislative branches in the colonies from the 
beginning of the eighteenth century was to confer upon owners or 
inhabitants of political divisions or organizations with political or 
governmental functions the attribute of legal personality, the es- 
sence of corporateness. This line of reasoning led to the incorpora- 
tion of religious societie~.~' At the beginning of the eighteenth cen- 
tury several colonies, borrowing from the statute of 1597 for the 
sS 4 A. S c o w  supra note 9, a t  5 348.2. 
" Holdsworth, English Corporation Law in the 16th and 17th Centuries, 31 YALE L.J. 
382,385, 391 (1922). See Sutton's Hospital Case, 10 Co. Rep., 23a, 77 Eng. Rep. 960 (1613 
K.B.). 
39 Eliz. I, ch. 5 (1597). Under this act, corporations could be formed for the following 
purposes: 
to erect, found, and establish, one or more hospitals, maison de Dieu, abiding 
places, or houses of correction,. . . as well as for the finding, sustentation, and 
relief of the maimed, poor, needy or impotent people, as to set the poor to work, 
to have continuance forever, and from time to time place therein such head and 
members, and such number of poor as to him, his heirs and assigns should seem 
convenient. 
Baldwin, History of the Law of Private Corporations in the Colonies and States, in 
3 SELECT ESSAYS ON ANGLO AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 236 (1909). 
87 Id. a t  241. 
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automatic incorporation of hospitals and houses of correction,Bs 
provided for self-incorporation of some religious, charitable or mu- 
nicipal  institution^.^^ Almost all colonial corporations had charita- 
ble purposes. They were churches, charities, educational institu- 
tions, or municipal  corporation^.^^ 
The early colonial corporations were of two kinds. The first was 
the public corporation - municipal corporations chartered by the 
towns or a few administrative boards charged with the oversight of 
public education, charity, and the like on behalf of local units of 
government. The second kind of private corporation included ec- 
clesiastical, educational, charitable, and business corporations. The 
most numerous in this second category were corporations con- 
cerned with religious ~orship.~ '  Next in numerical size were those 
formed for charitable or educational purposes, although they still 
might have a religious nature.72 Business corporations were few 
and of little importance. Many of the colonial business corpora- 
tions would be considered cooperatives or quasi-philanthropic to- 
day. They were incorporated for the purpose of erecting bridges, 
building or repairing roads, or promoting ends of general public 
utility.73 
F. The Charitable Corporation After Independence 
From the first years of the Republic, most states actively en- 
couraged the incorporation of private associations that performed 
vital public  service^.?^ Upon Independence, several state legisla- 
tures passed statutes permitting incorporation of charitable organi- 
39 Eliz. 1 ch. 5 (1597). 
eg Chayes, Introduction to JP. DAVIS, CORPORATIONS a t  vii (1961). 
70 L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 18, a t  166. In the eighteenth century, corporate charters 
were issued to only 335 businesses. Only seven charters were issued to businesses during the 
colonial period. 2 J.S. DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF AMERICAN CORPORATIONS 22 
(1917). 
71 1 J.S. DAVIS, supra note 70, a t  74-75. 
Id. a t  82. 
7s Id. a t  87,98,103. Other early corporations would be considered mutual benefit orga- 
nitations or trade associations such as the marine societies formed for the purpose of bring- 
ing together mariners of a particular port. 
" R. SEAVOY, THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATION 1784-1855, a t  255 
(1982). 
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zations such as churches, schools, and literary societies. Davis 
states: 
The constitution of South Carolina, adopted March 19, 1778, 
virtually assured freedom of incorporation for religious pur- 
poses, so far as "Christian Protestant" churches were con- 
cerned. New York passed a general incorporation act for reli- 
gious purposes April 6,1784. New Jersey followed suit March 
6, 1786, and Delaware on Feb. 3, 1787. On April 6, 1791, 
Pennsylvania passed a similar act granting freedom of incor- 
poration "for any literary, charitable, or for any religious pur- 
pose." In 1794 New Jersey provided similarly for "societies 
for the promotion of learning." In 1796 New York and in 1799 
New Jersey extended the privilege to library companies. In 
1788 Virginia and in 1798 Kentucky provided likewise for fire 
companies. There were probably a few other general incorpo- 
ration acts.?6 
There were. In Maryland, general incorporation statutes were, as 
elsewhere, first enacted for religious  corporation^.^^ In the North- 
west Territories a similar pattern occurred. In 1798 the legislative 
authority of the Northwest Territory, borrowing from the 1791 
Pennsylvania statute, enacted a general corporation law for organi- 
zations with literary, charitable, or religious purposes.77 The gen- 
eral act was not altered under the Indiana Territory and appears 
as an adoption of New York and Pennsylvania statutes in the 
Michigan Territorial Laws of 1821.'j8 
The rationale motivating the passage of early general incorpora- 
tion acts included advantage to the public if such incorporations 
were increased, convenience to individuals desiring to incorporate, 
relief of legislative workload, and promotion of freedom of 
2 J.S. DAVIS, supra note 70, at 16-17 (footnotes omitted). See 1784 N.Y. Laws 18. See 
generally Seavoy, The Public Service Origins of the American Business Corporation, 62 
Bus. HIST. REV. 30,38-39 (1978); J. CADMAN, THE CORPORATION N EW JERSEY 1791-1876, at 
5-6 (1949). 
J. BLANDI, MARYLAND BUSINESS CORPORATIONS 1783-1852, at 11 (1934). See 1802 Md. 
Laws 111; 1798 Md. Laws 24; 1779 Md. Laws 9. 
G. KUEHNL, THE WISCONSIN BUSINESS CORPORATION 7-8 (1959). 
l8 Id. at 8. 
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During the colonial period religious societies, if part of the estab- 
lished church, had been freely incorporated by royal governors and 
colonial assemblies. It was more difficult for other  denomination^.^^ 
Religious bodies were the first kind of organization to receive the 
special treatment of the general incorporation statutes, and not 
merely because of the number of charter applications they occa- 
sioned. The device of a general incorporation statute was seen as a 
means of implementing the policy of equal rights for all churches, 
an essential feature of the political philosophy of the new nation.s1 
By the second decade of the nineteenth century general incorpo- 
ration statutes existed in New York for educational institutions, 
libraries, agricultural societies, medical societies, and Bible and 
common prayer  organization^.^^ Other charitable and benevolent 
organizations were readily granted incorporation by special legisla- 
tive charter. Whenever a class of benevolent organizations was rec- 
ognized as being essentially nonpolitical and noncontroversial, a 
general incorporation law for that activity was readily passed.ss 
Despite the encouragement of corporateness, legislatures re- 
tained a tight control over corporate purposes and activities. The 
'@ The preamble to the Pennsylvania Statute of 1791 said in part: 
Whereas a great portion of the time of the legislature has heretofore been em- 
ployed in enacting laws to incorporate private associations and i t  would not only 
be more advantageous to the public, but also convenient to individuals who are 
desirous of being so incorporated, that the same might lawfully be effected, with- 
out immediate application in all cases to the general assembly of the 
commonwealth. 
Id. a t  7-8. 
no Baldwin, supra note 66, a t  248. 
J. CADMAN, supra note 75, a t  6. The preamble of the New Jersey law of 1786 provid- 
ing for general incorporation of religious societies stated: 
Whereas Petitions are frequently presented to the legislature from religious Socie- 
ties or Congregations of diierent denominations in this State, for Acts of Incorpo- 
ration, for the better transacting the temporal Concerns of said Societies or Con- 
gregations, and many laws having been passed for that Purpose, and the 
Legislature being desirous of granting and Privileges to every Denomination of 
Christians, and securing to them all their civil rights. 
1786 N.J. Laws 129. 
Seavoy, supra note 75, a t  43-45; R. SEAVOY, supra note 74, a t  9-32. 
R SEAVOY, supra note 74, a t  5. 
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New York general incorporation statute of 1784 for the incorpora- 
tion of religious societies had limitations upon the amount of an 
estate these bodies could accumulate and required trustees to 
render stated accounts to the Chan~ellor.~~ All of,the early general 
incorporation statues contained limitations upon the amounts of 
revenue to be held by such organizations and the purposes for 
which such revenue was to be applied and requirements for fur- 
nishing inventories and reporting any excess property to the legis- 
lature. The legislative policy was to enforce within certain limits 
the accumulation of property.85 
New York, which interpreted charitable trusts strictly, devel- 
oped a broad legislative scheme for public charities through the 
medium of corporate bodies.s6 Beginning in 1790 the New York 
legislature, concurrently with the general incorporation statutes, 
incorporated by special charters societies for a variety of religious, 
literary, scientific, benevolent, and charitable purposes. The corpo- 
rate body thus was kept under tight legislative control and 
supervision. 
In 1840 the New York legislature passed an act authorizing gifts 
of real and personal property to any incorporated college or other 
charitable ins t i tu t i~n .~~  In 1848 the legislature passed a general in- 
corporation statute for all classes of charitable organizati~ns.~~ A 
similar movement toward the consolidation of charitable corpora- 
tions into one general incorporation statute occurred in other 
" 1784 N.Y. Laws 18. 
Levy v. Levy, 33 N.Y. 97, 111 (1865). 
8e Other states also placed restrictions on charitable corporations. J. BLANDI, supra 
note 76, at 56-57, 61; J. CADMAN, supra note 75, at 15. 
1840 N.Y. Laws 318. 
" 1848 N.Y. Laws 319. The Act of 1848 provided for the general incorporation of be- 
nevolent, charitable, scientific, and missionary societies. Corporations could be formed by 
filing a certificate for any of the purposes listed in the title of the act. A majority of the 
signers had to be citizens and the certificate had to be approved in writing by a Justice of 
the Supreme Court. Corporations could take by purchase, devise or bequest real estate up to 
$50,000 in value, and personal property up to $75,000. These corporations were made sub- 
ject to visitation by Justices of the Supreme Court and were required to make annually a 
public statement of their affairs. In 1849 the statute was amended to provide that all ex- 
isting charitable corporations could reincorporate themselves under the Act of the previous 
year. 1849 N.Y. Laws 273. In 1862, the benefits of the Act were extended to authorize the 
incorporation of historical and literary societies. 1862 N.Y. Laws 273. 
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states in the middle of the nineteenth century.8B 
The New York legislature enacted the Membership Corporation 
Law in 1895, which consolidated into one statute the laws of chari- 
table corporations relating to medical societies, alumni corpora- 
tions, veterinary societies, library corporations, and several other 
types of eleemosynary organi~ations.~~ The Membership Corpora- 
tion Law applied to all corporations not organized for pecuniary 
profit except religious corporations and educational  corporation^.^^ 
The New York General Corporation Law applied to all corpora- 
tions, whether stock, municipal, or charitable, unless there was a 
provision in a more specialized statute such as the Membership 
Corporation Law, in which case the provisions of the latter would 
prevail. The General Corporation Law dealt with matters of inter- 
nal governance. 
The Membership Corporation Law, albeit frequently amended 
to move directors' responsibilities toward the business corporate 
remained the basic New York charitable corporation stat- 
ute until the passage of the Not-For-Profit Corporation Law in 
1970.B3 
Other states' charitable corporation statutes evolved similarly. In 
California in 1850, the first legislature enacted an "Act Concerning 
Corporations" which specially allowed charitable organizations to 
incorp~rate.~' Thereafter, a variety of piecemeal legislation was 
passed expanding the types of organizations that could incorpo- 
rate. California nonprofit legislation was generally skeletal, outlin- 
ing purposes specifically permitted, elections of directors, bylaw 
provisions, and the requirements for the holding and mortgaging of 
J. BLANDI, supra note 76, at 12-13; J. CADMAN, supra note 75, at 27. 
1895 N.Y. Laws 559. 
N.Y. MEM. CORP. LAW $ 2, 1895 N.Y. Laws 559 (repealed 1970). The Membership 
Corporation Law was revised in 1909 and 1940. It was succeeded by the New York Not-for- 
Profit Corporation Law in 1970. 
See infra text accompanying notes 156-73. 
See infra text accompanying note 171. 
B4 1850 Cal. Stat. 128 $8 175-84. Churches, congregations, religious, moral, beneficial, 
literary or scientific associations and societies were entitled to incorporate. A separate stat- 
ute was passed for the incorporation of educational institutions. 1850 Cal. Stat. 117 $$ 1-8. 
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property.95 In 1931, California enacted a General Nonprofit Corpo- 
ration Law,B6 based largely upon an Ohio act, which in turn had 
been drafted on the basis of the nonprofit statutes of New York, 
Maryland, Illinois and Mi~higan.~' The General Nonprofit Corpo- 
ration Law abandoned many of the restrictions on charitable cor- 
porations, and gave nonprofit corporations greater flexibility in in- 
ternal affairs. Nonprofit corporations were, however, also bound by 
the General Corporation Law, thereby carrying into nonprofit cor- 
poration law an undefined body of business corporate law.98 In 
other areas, such as the law relating to standards of conduct of 
directors, trust principles governed.99 The General Nonprofit Cor- 
poration Law was largely incorporated into the Corporation Code 
of 1947. In 1978, the current Nonprofit Corporation Law was en- 
acted and for the first time treated California nonprofit corpora- 
tion law as a coherent whole.loO 
Another reason the charitable corporation was favored over the 
charitable trust was the power of the legislature or executive of a 
state to dictate the terms of corporate privilege. Regulation of that 
privilege was thought to provide the state with greater control over 
charitable activities than the charitable trust, control of which 
would be exercised by an equity court.lol 
Incorporation enabled the trustees of a charitable organization 
to receive legacies and bequests, and it provided cheap legal pro- 
cess a t  the local level to ensure property was held in the corporate 
1 H.W. BALLANTINE & R. STERLING, CALIFORNIA CORPORATION LAWS 5 401-.01 (R.B. 
Clark, 4th ed. 1984). 
e6 CAL. CIV. CODE, Title 12, Art. I (1931). 
O7 H.W. BALLANTINE & R. STERLING, CALIFORNIA CORPORATION LAWS 529 (1949). 
H. W. BALLANTINE & R. STERLING, supra note 95, a t  5 401.01[2]. Other laws applied 
to special types of charitable organizations such as societies for the prevention of cruelty to 
children, agricultural fair corporations, and institutions of higher learning. 
e8 Abbott and Kornblum, The Jurisdiction of the Attorney General Over Corporate 
Fiduciaries Under the New California Nonprofit Corporation Law 13 U.S.F.L. REV. 753, 
765-769 (1978-79). 
loo For a discussion of the California Statute, See infra text accompanying notes 239- 
52. The background to the enactment of the current statute can be found in 1 H. W. BAL- 
LANTINE & R. STERLING, supra note 95, a t  8 401.01[2]. 
lo' Cf. Levy v. Levy, 33 N.Y. 97,112 (1865); Oaks, Trust Doctrines in Church Contro- 
versies, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REV. 805, 858-60. 
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name, thus enabling title in such property to be defended at law in 
the name of the corporation.lo2 The local public service function of 
early American corporations distinguished them from their English 
counterparts and led to their legislative encouragement.lo3 This ra- 
tionale for the willingness to grant corporate charters was ex- 
pressed in the first American corporate law treatise: "It has been 
generally the policy and custom (especially in the United States) to 
incorporate all associations whose object tends to the public ad- 
vantage in relation to municipal government, commerce, literature, 
and religion. The public benefit is deemed a sufficient considera- 
tion of a grant' of corporate privilege."lo4 
G. The Importance of Tax Exemption 
In the twentieth century, the growth of the nonprofit corpora- 
tion was spurred by the growing importance of tax exemption in an 
increasingly taxed society. Exemption of charitable organizations 
from taxation has long roots in English and American history.lo6 
Charitable, religious, and educational organizations were exempt 
from taxation in the Revenue Act of 1894.1°6 This preferred status 
later was granted to other types of nonprofit organizations.lo7 Ra- 
lo' R. SEAVOY, supra note 74, a t  255. 
loS 2 J. S. DAVIS, supra note 70, a t  7-8; L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 18, a t  167. 
lW J. ANGELL & S. ~ I E S ,  A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS, AGGRE- 
GATE 7 (1832, reprint ed. 1972). 
lo5 Exemption of charities from taxation goes back a t  least to the Statute of Charitable 
Uses. 43 Eliz. 1, ch. 4 (1601). From the Colonial period, tax exemption, particularly with 
respect to churches, was common. Religious organizations were given exemption from taxa- 
tion at  all levels of government. B. HOPKINS, supra note 4, a t  5. Prior to the passage of the 
first federal income tax legislation in 1894, all customs and other tax legislation specified the 
items subject to taxation. Tax exemption existed by omission from taxation legislation. Mc- 
Govern, The Exemption Provisions of Sub-chapter F, 29 TAX LAW. 523, 524 (1976). 
loB Revenue Act of 1894,28 Stat. 509 c. 349 (1894); declared unconstitutional in Pol- 
lock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895). See Bittker and Rahdert, The 
Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299, 
302-03 (1976). 
lo7 Fraternal benefit organizations and certain building and loan associations were 
g ra ted  exempt status under the Revenue Act of 1894. Subsequent revenue acts expanded 
exempt status to labor, agricultural, and horticultural organizations; mutual cemetary com- 
panies, business leagues, chambers of commerce, social welfare organizations, and scientific 
organizations; social clubs, land banks, organizations associated with farming and title com- 
panies, public utilities and state instrumentalities; societies for the prevention of cruelty to 
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tionales for tax exemption of nonprofit organizations have been 
based on historical, political, public policy, and moral grounds.10B 
Exempt organizations are characterized as serving public pur- 
poses rather than narrowly drawn private interests.loe Since non- 
profits are considered more responsive to community than personal 
goals, they are granted certain privileges.l10 To qualify for exemp- 
tion from income taxation, the private inurement proscription ap- 
plies to all organizations.ll1 
Perhaps more important to the growth and importance of the 
tax exempt sector was the granting in 1917 of a deduction against 
individual income taxes for contributions to exempt organiza- 
tions.l12 Concomitant with this privilege was the increasing regula- 
tion of exempt organizations by the federal government.l13 Perhaps 
animals and children; community chests, funds, or foundations; and organizations that fos- 
ter national and international sports competitions, certain homeowner associations, and 
fishing associations. P. TREUSCH & N. SUGARMAN, TAX EXEMPT CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS 4- 
5 (2d ed. 1983). 
Io8 McGovern, supra note 105, a t  527, cites the heritage or tradition of exemption for 
religious or charitable organizations: morality, in that organizations such as mutual savings 
banks founded and financed for the mutual benefit of members such as mutual savings 
banks should not be taxed; and politics as exemplified by special interest legislation. See 
also B. HOPKINS, LAW OP TAX EXEMPTION, supra note 4, a t  3-7. 
I O U  See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(l)(ii) (1976). 
'I0 E. GINSBURG, D. HIESTAND, & B. REUBENS, supra note 4, a t  22. "Evidently the ex- 
emption is made in recognition of the benefit which the public derives from corporate activi- 
ties of the class named, and is intended to aid them when not conducted for private gain." 
Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden 'de Predicatores, 263 U.S. 578, 581 (1924). "The State has an 
f i r n a t i v e  policy that considers these groups [religious organizations] as beneficial and sta- 
bilizing influences in community life and finds this classification [tax exempt status] useful, 
desirable, and in the public interest." Walz v. Tax Commission of the City of New York, 397 
U.S. 664, 673 (1970). See B. HOPKINS, supra note 4, a t  5-7. 
"I P. TREUSCH & N. SUGARMAN, supra note 107, a t  38-39. 
'la War Revenue Act, Pub. L. No. 50,40 Stat. 300,330 (1917). Corporate contributions 
became deductible in 1935 subject to a percentage of income limitation. Revenue Act of 
1935,g 102(r), Pub. L. No. 407,49 Stat. 1014,1016 (1935). See P. TREUSCH & N. SUGARMAN, 
supra note 107, a t  5-10. 
The private inurement prpcription was enacted in 1909. Corporation Excise Tax 
Act, 8 38, Pub. L. No. 51, 36 Stat. 11, 112-113 (1909). In 1934 a limitation on political 
activities was enacted. Revenue Act, 3 101(b), Pub. L. No. 216,48 Stat. 680,700 (1934). In 
1954, Section 501(c)(3) organizations were prohibited from campaigning on behalf of any 
candidate for public office. Internal Revenue Act, Pub. L. No. 591, 68A Stat. 1, 163 (1954). 
Lobbying by "public" charities was liberalized by the Tax Reform Act, 3 1307, Pub. L. No. 
94-455,90 Stat. 1520 (1976). Corporate charitable deductions were limited in 1935 to grants 
H e i n o n l i n e  - -  34 Emory L. J. 638 1985 
19851 NONPROFIT CORPORATION LAW 639 
the most significant regulatory changes occurred in 1969 when re- 
strictions were placed upon all private foundations and a presump- 
tion was created that all 8 501(c)(3) organizations were private 
foundations unless they could prove that they fell within one of 
the three enunciated public charity exceptions.l14 Private founda- 
tions were prohibited from acts of self dealing, from making cer- 
tain investments, or from accumulating income. Severe penalties 
were imposed for violations of these strictures.l16 Federal regula- 
tion has shaped nonprofit corporation statutes and has removed 
the impetus for state efforts to enforce and reform state nonprofit 
corporation law. Often, states have merely tracked Internal Reve- 
nue Code pros~riptions*~~ and have yielded enforcement efforts to 
the Internal Revenue Service. Nonprofit corporation statutes have 
been an afterthought. 
A. English Precedents 
There has been no coherent development of the law of nonprofit 
organizations. In England charitable organizations ordinarily were 
organized as charitable trusts.l17 For the aforementioned reasons 
the charitable corporation became a more popular organizational 
form for nonprofit activities in the United Statee.llS The growth in 
size and complexity of modern charitable organizations has re- 
sulted in an increasing abandonment of the charitable trust in 
for domestic use when made to noncorporate donees. Revenue Act, 3 102(r), Pub. L. No. 
407.49 Stat. 1014,1016 (1935). In 1938, individuals could only limit contributions to domes- 
tic grantees. Revenue Act ] 23(]0), Pub. L. No. 554, 52 Stat. 447, 463 (1938). Certain 
prohibitions on self dealing were introduced. Revenue Act, 3 331, Pub. L. No. 814, 64 Stat. 
906, 957-59 (1950). In 1950, 33 421-24 were added to I.R.C. of 1939. Revenue Act, 3 301, 
Pub. L. No. 814,64 Stat. 906,948 (1950). See generally P. TREUSCH & N. SUGARMAN, supra 
note 107, a t  5-8. 
"' Revenue Act 3 101, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487, 492-498 (1969). 
n6 Id. (adding Chapter 42 ($3 4940-48) to the I.R.C. of 1954). See P. TREUSCH & N. 
SUGARMAN, supra note 107, a t  5-10. 
no See OR REV. STAT. 3 61.955 (1983); S.C. CODE ANN. 3 33-31-310 (Law. Co-op. 1976); 
TENN. CODE ANN. 3 48-1-604 (1984). 
n7 W. JORDAN, PHILANTHROPY IN ENGLAND 1480-1600, a t  119 (1950); A. SCOTT, supra 
note 9, a t  3 348.2; M. F'REMONT-SMITH, supra note 11, at  18-27. 
n8 See supra text accompanying notes 33-61. 
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favor of the corporate form.l19 Unlike England, we have no law of 
charities or even an agreed upon definition of the word.120 
Most English common law cases on corporations dealt with char- 
itable corporations, particularly ecclesiastical corporations, a cate- 
gory of corporation disfavored in this country after the Revolution 
and the disestablishment of the Anglican Church.121 Blackstone, 
who devoted only nineteen pages in the Commentaries to the law 
of corporations, primarily cited cases involving eleemosynary and 
ecclesiastical corporations, as did Stewart Kyd in A Treatise on 
the Law of C~rporations.'~~ Municipal corporations were also well 
known to English law. 
Business corporations did not become important in England un- 
til the middle of the nineteenth century. As a result, English cor- 
porate law furnished only a few fundamental concepts and legal 
rules, and had a limited impact upon the development of American 
corporate law.123 One of the first legal issues involving charitable 
corporations in the United States was whether they were "public" 
in the sense of a municipal corporation or "private" like the busi- 
ness corporation. 
B. The Classification of Nonprofit Corporations: The Public-Pri- 
vate Dichotomy 
The classification of charitable corporations as "public" or "pri- 
vate" corporations had an important influence upon the future of 
the charitable corporate form in the United States and upon the 
relationship of charitable corporate law to the law of business 
'IB Note, supra note 8. 
I" Charities Act, 1960, 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, ch. 58 §§ 45(1), 46, contains a definition of 
charity: 
In this Act, except in so far as the context otherwise requires, charity means any 
institution, corporate or not, which is established for charitable purposes and is 
subject to the control of the High Court in the exercise of the court's jursdiction 
with respect to charities. 
la' Dodd, "American Business Association Law A Hundred Years Ago and Today" in 
LAW: A CENTURY OF PROGRESS, 254, 281 (1937); See Oaks, supra note 101, a t  825. 
'" W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *467-85; S. KYD, A TR?~ATIsE ON THE LAW OP CORPO- 
RATIONS (1603, repr. ed. 1973 & 1978). 
IaS E. DODD, AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATIONS UNTIL 1860, a t  1 (1954). 
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corporations. 
English corporations were divided into lay and ecclesiastical cat- 
eg0riet3.l~~ Lay corporations existed of two sorts, civil and eleemos- 
ynary. Civil corporations received their corporate capacity from 
the monarch and existed for public purposes of governance. They 
included local government corporations and those with a public 
purpose such as the public trading company. Courts of law could 
examine the validity of the corporations and their charters.126 Elee- 
mosynary corporations were established to carry into effect some 
public charitable purpose - the distribution of free alms or a dona- 
tion by the founder in such manner as directed. In this class were 
colleges as well as hospitals for the relief of the p00r. l~~ 
The common law of English corporations, which applied to all 
corporate forms, dealt with two principal aspects: internal rules 
and procedures. In a crucial respect the rules of eleemosynary cor- 
porations differed from those of civil corporations. The eleemosy- 
nary corporation was founded upon private property. It was 
founded by private persons, based upon the founders' private 
property and subject to their control, rules, and visitorial powers. 
In the United States, Chancellor Kent in his Commentaries 
adopted the English classification of corporations into ecclesiasti- 
cal and lay.12? This scheme was later rejected by American courts, 
because incorporated religious societies were not considered eccle- 
siastical in the sense of English law but belonged instead to a sub- 
class of the civil corporations ~ateg0ry. l~~ This difference in classi- 
fication resulted from the absence of an established church in the 
United States and the constitutional guarantees to all denomina- 
la' The first division of corporations was into aggregate and sole corporations. Aggre- 
gate corporations consisted of many persons united together into one society. Sole corpora- 
tions consisted of one person, typically a clergyman, who was incorporated by law in order 
to give him some legal capacity and advantage, particularly that of perpetuity. W. BLACK- 
STONE, Supra note 122, a t  *469-70. 
Phillips v. Bury, 87 Eng. Rep. 289 (K.B. 1694); W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 122, a t  
*470-72; 1 S. KYD, supra note 122, a t  19-32. 
Ia8 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 122, a t  *471-72; See S. KYD, supra note 122, a t  25-27. 
la' 1 J. KENT, supra note 46, a t  *274. 
12' Robertson v. Bullions, 11 N.Y. 243, 251-52 (1854). 
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tions.lZ9 By subsuming the law of religious organizations under the 
law of civil corporations, courts could apply general aspects of cor- 
porate law to all charitable bodies, while avoiding decisions which 
broached religious doctrines or principles. 
C. Charitable Corporations as Private Corporations: The 
Dartmouth College Case 
Until the Dartmouth College case,lgO it was uncertain whether 
colleges and business enterprises would be placed in the same cate- 
gory as private  corporation^.^^^ If charitable corporations such as 
universities or colleges were classified as public corporations, the 
state could alter the organization's charter as it saw fit. Patrons 
might lose incentive to donate to a charitable corporation if their 
munificence was susceptible to state tampering. If the charitable 
corporation were a private institution, as the Supreme Court con- 
cluded in the Dartmouth College case, the charter could not be 
altered because of the Contracts Clause of the United States Con- 
s t i t u t i ~ n . ~ ~ ~  The Dartmouth College decision thus established a 
categorical similarity between charitable corporations and business 
corporations. As a result, the development of business corporation 
law in the nineteenth century provided guidance for the internal 
operating rules of charitable corporations. 
In an 1805 decision, Trustees of the University v. Foy,lg9 the 
North Carolina Supreme Court presaged the Dartmouth College 
case by holding that a legislature could not repeal a grant of prop- 
erty once given to a university.corporation, on the grounds that it 
violated the bill of rights as well as the state constitution. The 
court concluded: "although the Trustees are corporations estab- 
lished for public purposes, . . . their property is as completely be- 
yond the control of the Legislature as the property of individuals 
or that of any other corporati~n."'~~ 
12e Cf. Oaks, supra note 101, at 836. 
lS0 Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). 
lS1 E. DODD, supra note 123, at 17. 
lS1 U. S. CONST. art. I, 5 10. 
lSS 5 N.C. (1 Mur.) 57. 
la' Id. at 63. The court also stated: 
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On December 13, 1769 the British crown, through the colonial 
governor of New Hampshire, granted a charter incorporating 
twelve persons under the name of "The Trustees of Dartmouth 
College". This charter gave the trustees and their successors the 
power to fill vacancies on the Board of Trustees. By acts dated 
June 27, 1816 and thereafter, the New Hampshire legislature 
amended the charter by changing the name of the college to 
Dartmouth University, increasing the number of trustees to 
twenty-one, giving the powers of appointment of additional trust- 
ees to the executive of the state, and creating a board of twenty- 
five overseers with power to review and disapprove of the most im- 
portant acts of the trustees.136 
The majority of the college's trustees refused to accept the 
amended charter and brought suit.lg6 As generations of law stu- 
dents have learned, the United States Supreme Court, in a deci- 
sion by Justice Marshall, held that the college was a private corpo- 
ration; the charter was a contract within the meaning of the 
Contract Clause of the United States Constitution; the New 
Hampshire legislature's act of altering the charter without the con- 
sent of the corporation impaired the obligation of the charter and 
Indeed, i t  seems difficult to conceive of a corporation established for merely pri- 
vate purposes. In every institution of that kind, the ground of the establishment is 
some public good or purpose intended to be promoted; but in many the members 
thereof have a private interest, coupled with the public object. In this case, the 
trustees have no private interest beyond the general good; yet we conceive that 
circumstances will not make the property of the Trustees subject to the arbitrary 
will of the Legislature. The property vested in the Trustees must remain for the 
uses intended for the University until the Judiciary of the country in the usual 
and common form pronounce them guilty of such acts as will, in law, amount to a 
forfeiture of their rights or dissolution of their body. 
Id. 
This analysis of the public purposes of all corporations foreshadows the majority's decision 
in Dartmouth College 
la' The charter, the subsequent amending legislation, and the facts of the litigation, are 
set out in elaborate detail in Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. a t  519-551. Under the charter, the 
founder and President of the college, Eleazar Wheelock, could nominate his successor. 
Wheelock's son, John Wheelock, was President a t  the time of the dispute. His administra- 
tion was challenged by the Trustees of the College, and Wheelock carried the dispute to the 
state's politicians. The politics surrounding the case are well described in M. BAXTER, 
DANIEL WEBSTER & THE SUPREME COURT 65-109 (1966). 
IS6 Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. a t  626-27; M. BAXTER, supra note 135, a t  70-71. 
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was thus unconsti t~tional.~~~ 
The decision that a charitable corporation was a private corpora- 
tion was not a foregone conclusion. English lay corporations were 
civil or eleemosynary, but English law made no distinction between 
public or private corporations. Blackstone affirmed the right of a 
founder of a college or other corporation to name his or her succes- 
sors at common law, but the Court was not bound to follow the 
English rule.lS8 The New Hampshire legislature did not necessarily 
face the same limits as the monarch under English common law 
nor was the New Hampshire legislature equivalent in rights to Par- 
liament.lS8 Another factor that could have caused the decision to 
go against Dartmouth College was whether the college actually was 
operated as a public institution-a forerunner of modern state ac- 
tion arguments. The Court, however, found that almost all corpo- 
rations served public purposes and benefited the nation.140 These 
public purposes, said Marshall, would be unattainable for most ele- 
emosynary institutions without the aid of a charter of 
inc~rpora t ion .~~~ 
The character of civil institutions did not derive from the incor- 
poration itself but from the manner of formation. Although 
Dartmouth had public purposes, the college was a private charita- 
ble entity because private individuals founded the corporation. 
Whereas the civil corporation was a creature of public institutions 
for public advantage, the private corporation was endowed by pri- 
vate persons and subject to their control, laws, and visitation, and 
not to the general control of the government. These private powers 
and rights flowed from the property of the founder in the funds 
assigned for the support of the charity.142 
The Dartmouth College case provided assurances that the grants 
I-- 
lS7 Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. a t  641, 651-52. The importance of the case for corpo- 
rate law purposes was limited by the suggestion in Justice Story's concurrence that a legisln- 
ture could amend a chaiter if i t  reserved that right in the original grant. Id. a t  675,708,712. 
W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 122, a t  *481-83. 
lSB M. BAXTER, supra note 135, a t  85. 
140 Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. a t  637. 
l4I  Id. 
14' Id. a t  660-61 (Washington, J. concurring). 
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of private capital to charities would be protected from government 
control and appropriation. As Daniel Webster noted in his brief for 
the Court: 
If the franchise may be at any time taken away, or impaired, 
property may also be taken away, or its use perverted. Bene- 
factors who have no certainty of effecting the object of their 
bounty; and learned men will be deterred from devoting 
themselves to the service of such institutions, from the preca- 
rious title of their offices. Colleges and halls will be deserted 
by all better spirits, and become a theatre for the contention 
of politics. Party and faction will be cherished in these places 
consecrated to piety and 1ear11ing.l~~ 
Justice Marshall reflected this argument when he commented that 
a great inducement to charitable gifts is the conviction felt by the 
donor that the disposition is immutable and that the corporation 
constitutes the security for such gifts.144 
D. The Early Law of Fiduciaries - The Origins of Trustee 
Powers 
1. Visitorial Rights 
Perhaps the most disputed area of nonprofit corporation law in- 
volves the rights and duties of directors of charitable corpora- 
t i o n ~ . ' ~ ~  The law has moved from rigid trust principles to nearly 
Ids Id. at 599. 
Id. at 647. 
S. Weil, Breaches of Trust: Museums, Ethics & The Law in BEAUTY AND THE 
BEASTS: ON MUSEUMS, ART, THE LAW AND THE MARKET (1983); Albert, The Legal Liabilities 
of Trustees, Directors and Officers of a Non-Profit Cultural Institution - Preparing for and 
Dealing with Financial Difficulties and Dissolution in NON-PROFIT CULTURAL ORGANIZA- 
TIONS 103 (H. Horowitz, ed. 1979); Du Boff ,  Duties and Liabilities of Trustees in NON- 
PROFIT CULTURAL ORGANIZATIONS 61 (H. Horowitz ed. 1979); Eyster, Responsibilities of Di- 
rectors and Trustees of Not for Profit Organizations, 4 ART & THE LAW 13 (1978); Gersten- 
blith, The Fiduciary Duties of Museum Trustees, 8 ART & THE LAW, 175 (1983); Hackler, 
Hospital Trustees' Fiduciary Responsibilities: An  Emerging Tripartite Distinction, 15 
WASHBURN L.J. 422 (1976); Hansmann, Reforming, supra note 6, at 567-74; Karst, supra 
note 5; Marsh, Gouernance of Non-Projit Organizations: An  Appropriate Standard of Con- 
duct for Trustees and Directors of Museums and other Cultural Institutions, 85 DICK. L.
REV. 607 (1981); Merryman, Are Museum Trustees and the Law out of Step, ARTNEWS, 
Nov. 1975, at 24; (1975); Oleck, Proprietary Mentality and the New Nonprofit Corporation 
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wholesale adoption of the business corporation director's standards 
of conduct. 
At common law the founders of a charitable corporation, the in- 
dividuals who originally donated funds and revenues, and their 
heirs, had the right to visit, inquire into, and correct all irregulari- 
ties and abuses which arose in the course of the administration of 
the funds d~nated."~ This visitorial power, which attached to all 
eleemosynary and ecclesiastical corporations, was an enforcement 
mechanism and could compel the original purpose of the charity to 
be "faithfully fulfilled."147 The theory of the visitorial power was 
that private, charitable corporations founded and endowed by pri- 
vate persons were subject to the private government and rules of 
the founders. Therefore, they could be visited by the founders, 
their heirs, or such other persons as they app~inted.~ '~ The direc- 
tor's power of governance of the charitable corporation developed 
from the visitorial power. 
The founders could assign their visitation right or could nomi- 
nate others-trustees-to manage or supervise the charity. In that 
context the visitorial power rested on the trustees in their corpo- 
rate character.lqB In the United States, colleges and universities 
were usually established by a founder who invested in the incorpo- 
rating governors or trustees the right of visitation. The manage- 
ment of the charitable corporation was vested in the trustees.160 In 
Laws, 20 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 145 (1971); Report, Committee on Charitable Trusts, Duties of 
Charitable Trust Trustees and Charitable Corporation Directors, 2 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR 
J. 545 (1967); Note, Dissolution of Public Charity Corporations: Preventing Improper Dis- 
tribution of Assets, 59 TEX L. REV. 1429 (1981); Note, The Fiduciary Duties of Loyalty and 
Care Associated with the Directors and Trustees of Charitable Organizations, 64 VA. L. 
REV. 449 (1978). 
Allen v. McKean, 1 F. Cas. 489,497 (C.C.D. Me. 1833) (No. 229); Philips v. Bury, 87 
Eng. Rep. 289 (K.B. 1694). 
14' Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. at 673 (Story, J., concurring). According to Chancellor 
Kent, the visitorial power applied only to ecclesiastical and charitable corporations. J. KENT, 
supra note 46, at *300. 
J. KENT, supra note 46, at *303. 
I4O Allen v. McKean, 1 F. Cas. 489, 497-98. 
160 J. KENT, supra note 46, at *302. Variations were adopted. For instance at Harvard, 
a power o f  inspection was given to a Board o f  Overseers. It  was not strictly speaking a 
visitorial power, which belongs to the fellows or members o f  the corporation. Some early 
corporations had both a board o f  directors and trustees. See Sealy, The Director as Trustee, 
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England, when the founder had not appointed other visitors or did 
not exercise visitorial rights, the duties of visitation were reserved 
in the crown. Because of its ecclesiastical origins and the essen- 
tially aristocratic tone of its vesting in the heirs of the founder or 
their designates, the visitorial right in the English sense became 
disfavored in the United States upon Independence and is of little 
importance today.lS1 Despite its contemporary unimportance, it il- 
luminates the origins of the charitable corporation's board of direc- 
tors and their supervisory authority. 
2. Duties of Trustees 
It was determined, at least in dicta, by the early nineteenth cen- 
tury that a court of equity obtained jurisdiction over a charitable 
corporation in cases of a breach of trust by its board of directors or 
officers.162 The attorney general had the power to use the writ of 
quo warranto, the remedy for prohibiting a corporation from mis- 
using or exceeding its franchise or for obtaining a forfeiture of the 
charter.lS3 Private citizens could use the writ of quo warranto only 
as a relator.lU4 Their more typical remedy was the writ of manda- 
1967 CA~~BRIDGE L.J. 83, 84-85. 
I" J. KENT, supra note 46, a t  *303-304; Oaks, supra note 101, a t  853; Nelson v. Cush- 
ing, 56 Mass. (2 Cush.) 519, 532 (1848). 
Io1 Attorney General v. Utica Ins. Co., 2 Johns Ch. 371,389 (N.Y. ch. 1817); Nelson v. 
Cushing, 56 Mass. (2 Cush.) 519,531-32 (1848); 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURIS- 
PRUDENCE 3 1584 (14th ed. 1918). Because the visitorial power ultimately lay in the crown 
upon an abuse or breach of trustee duty, a court of chancery did not have the initial author- 
ity to supervise the administration of a charitable corporation. However, an equity court 
had the power to prevent a breach of trust which might arise from a misapplication of trust 
funds. In the'words of Chancellor Kent: 
It is now settled that the trustees or governors of a literary or charitable institu- 
tion, to whom the visitorial power is deemed to vest by the incorporation, are not 
placed beyond the reach of the law. As managers of the revenues of the corpora- , 
tion they are subject to the general superintending power of the Court of Chan- 
cery, not as itself possessing a visitorial power or a right to control the charity, but 
as possessing a general jurisdiction in all cases of an abuse of trust, to redress 
grievances, and suppress fraud. 
J. KENT, supra note 46, a t  *303-04. 
While the visitorial power has become unimportant, i t  illustrates the origins of the charita- 
ble corporation's board of directors and their power to manage the corporation. 
lug E. DODD, supra note 123, a t  57-61, 181-83; Oaks, supra note 101 a t  553-55. 
IM E. DODD, supra note 123, a t  58-59. 
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mus to compel a corporation to live up to its charter. In the early 
nineteenth century, mandamus was available in some states to 
members and officers of nonprofit corporations who claimed that 
they had been wrongfully deprived of their memberships or 
0ff i~es . l~~ 
In this period, however, little progress had been made in either 
the business corporate or nonprofit area to define the fiduciary du- 
ties of dire~tors. '~~ Directors and officers of corporations were 
agents or guardians under English law and were subject to rigorous 
fiduciary responsibilities and duties of 10yalty.l~~ According to 
Dodd, in spite of the absence of case law in the period from 1800 
to 1830, English principles of fiduciary duty were known in 
Kent's Commentaries, first published in 1827, and 
Story's Equity Jurisprudence, initially published in 1836, dealt ex- 
tensively with the fiduciary relati~nship.'~~ In a New York decision 
in 1832, Chancellor Wadsworth said, in dictum, that directors of a 
business corporation would be liable to the corporation for losses 
due to their negligence or ultra vires actions.lBO 
In the nineteenth century, directors were held in check through 
strict limitations upon corporate powers and statutory prohibitions 
against self-dealing.lsl For instance, New York's General Incorpo- 
ration Act of 1848 limited charitable corporations' holding of real 
property to $50,000 and personal property to $75,000. The annual 
income from real and personal property could not exceed 
'06 See, e.g., Fuller v. Plainfield Academic School, 6 Conn. 532 (1827); Commonwealth 
v. St. Patrick Benevolent Society, 2 Binn. 441 (Pa. 1810). See Generally E. DODD, supra 
note 123, a t  62-63. 
lo6 Dodd, supm note 121, a t  254, 281. In Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige 222 (N.Y. 1832), 
the court held that directors could not deny to a board member the right to examine the 
corporation's books. 
lE7 See, e.g., Charitable Corp. v. Sutton, 26 Eng. Rep. 642 (Ch. 1742). The plaintiff was 
misnamed, for i t  was not a charitable corporation. 
E. DODD, supra note 123, a t  70. 
4 J. KENT, supm note 46, a t  *341-46; 1 J. STORY, supra note 152, a t  $5 430-50. 
lE0 Robinson V. Smith, 3 Paige 222, 231 (N.Y. 1832). 
lB1 This proscription applied to directors of business corporations as well. See Marsh, 
Are Directors Trustees? Conflict of Interest and Corporate Morality, 22 Bus. LAW. 35,36-43 
(1966). 
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$10,000.162 Trustees were jointly and severally liable for all debts 
due.le3 All charitable corporations were subject to visitations by 
justices of the Supreme Court. Directors were required to file an- 
nual reports with the clerk of the county in which the certificate 
was filed.le4 They could not engage in transactions in which they 
were interested unless such transactions were authorized in the by- 
laws and assented to by vote of all of the directors.1e6 In nineteenth 
century corporate law, the position of director brought with it a 
high sense of responsibility and duty. 
From the enactment of the Membership Corporation Law in 
1895,1e6 the standards of conduct for directors of nonprofit corpo- 
rations have progressively been eroded. Under that statute, direc- 
tors had to present to their members an annual report showing ac- 
quisition, disposal, and holding of property, and unlike their 
business corporation counterparts, still were personally liable for 
short term debts.ls7 Restrictions on the purchase, sale, and leasing 
of property were mitigated, but court approval was required for 
leases exceeding three years.les The ban on interested transactions 
was relaxed. Such transactions could be approved if authorized by 
the bylaws and by a concurring vote of all of the directors.le9 
By 1926, directors no longer had liability for the corporation's 
debts, and interested transactions could be approved if authorized 
by the bylaws or by a concurring vote of two-thirds of the direc- 
tors.170 The New York Not-For-Profit Corporation Law, which was 
enacted in 1970 and superseded the Membership Corporation Law, 
utilized virtually the same requirements for standards of care and 
lea 1848 N.Y. Laws 319 3 2. 
leg Id. at 3 7. 
lW Id. at 1 8. 
lea 1872 N.Y. Laws 104 3 1. 
lee 1895 N.Y. Laws 559. 
le7 N.Y. MEM. COW. LAW 3 11,1895 N.Y. Laws 559 (repealed 1970). The unlimited lia- 
bility for short term debts did not apply to directors of societies for the prevention of cru- 
elty to animals or children and of political parties! 
leW.Y. MEM. COW. LAW 3 13, 1895 N.Y. Laws 559 (repealed 1970). 
Ie0 Id. at 3 12. Directors could receive a salary if authorized by the bylaws or by a two- 
thirds concurring vote of all of the directors. 
170 1926 N.Y. Laws 722 $3 46-47. No longer did charities have to obtain permission 
from the Supreme Court to lease property for more than three years. 
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interested transactions as New York's Business Corporation 
Law.17' Almost all other jurisdictions have moved from the charita- 
ble trust to the business corporate standards of conduct for direc- 
tors of nonprofit corporations. California maintained the trust 
standards of conduct until the enactment of its Nonprofit Corpora- 
tion Law in 1980.172 That statute's approach to interested transac- 
tions is an attempt to create a more substantial approval process 
for public benefit charitable corporations than for business corpo- 
r a t ion~ . '~~  California is the only state to consider the special needs 
of nonprofit corporations in regulating interested transactions. 
E. Nonprofit Corporation Law, the Law of Charitable Trusts, 
and Business Corporation Law: Similarities and Differences 
1. Similarities With Charitable Trust Law 
Many of the principles and rules applicable to charitable trusts 
apply to the charitable ~orporation.'~~ Both can receive tax exemp- 
tions, though the tax consequences can be quite different.lT6 For 
both organizational forms there is a relaxation of the rule against 
perpetuities and limited tort liability.176 Both are under the super- 
vision of the attorney general, who can maintain a suit to prevent 
the diversion of property to purposes other than those for which it 
was given.177 The doctrine of cy pres applies to both.178 In matters 
relating to the public purposes or the objectives of the organiza- 
tion, courts traditionally have honored trust principles and stan- 
dards for the charitable corporation. Where property is given to a 
charitable corporation with restrictions or specific terms, the cor- 
poration is under the same duty as the charitable trust to devote 
Compare N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROPIT COW. LAW 38 715, 717 (McKiney  1970 & Supp. 
1984-85) with N.Y. Bus. COW. LAW 3s 713, 717 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1984-85). 
' 72  Abbott & Kornblum, supra note 99, at 757-64. 
See CAL. COW. CODE 8 5233 (West Supp. 1985). 
17' RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, at 8 348 comment f. 
17"ee P. TREUSCH & N. SUGARMAN, supra note 107, at 27-28; Fisch, Choosing the 
Charitable Entity, 114 TR. & EST. 874, 893-94 (1975). 
Note, supra note 8, at 1174. 
4 A. Scorn, supra note 9, at 8 348.1. 
Id. 
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the property to the specified charitable purpose.lge Until recently, 
the standards of care and loyalty for directors of both organiza- 
tional forms were similar.180 However courts in no state look solely 
at  trust principles for the solution of problems relating to charita- 
ble  corporation^.^^^ Other legal rules differ for the two organiza- 
tional forms and the dissimilarities are widening as the operating 
principles of the charitable corporation become more analogous to 
those of the business corporation. 
2. Legal Distinctions Between the Charitable Corporation and 
the Charitable Trust 
An early procedural distinction between the charitable corpora- 
tion and the charitable trust was that Chancery would not assume 
the visitorial power and exercise supervisory power over a charita- 
ble corporation. Equity did have, however, a residual power if the 
directors abused their trust.lS2 In the United States, courts con- 
cluded at  an early date that corporate trustees were subject to the 
jurisdiction of equity courts.183 This meant that corporate directors 
St. Joseph's Hospital v. Bennett, 281 N.Y. 115, 22 N.E. 2d. 305 (1939). 
180 In 1969 Cary and Bright could write "The standard by which directors of a charita- 
ble corporation are most often judged in the administration of the corporation's affairs is 
that which 'a man of common prudence ordinarily exercises in his own affairs.' " W. CARY & 
C. BRIGHT, supra note 5, a t  40. This is no longer the standard. See supra text accompanying 
notes 170-72. 
18' W. CARY & C. BRIGHT, supra note 5, at 18. 
lea Attorney General v. Middleton, 28 Eng. Rep.210 (ch. 1751). See ako J. KENT, supra 
note 46, a t  *305; Oaks, supra note 101, a t  823-25. At common law, a t  least in the eighteenth 
century, a court of chancery "merely in virtie of its general jurisdiction over trusts" had a 
right to enforce the due performance of charitable bequests. The jurisdiction of equity 
courts was derived from their general authority to carry into execution the trusts of a will or 
other instruments according to the intention expressed in that will or instrument. 3 J. 
STORY, supra note 152, a t  § 1580; Oaks, supra note 101, a t  820-21. In the nineteenth century 
the visitorial right declined in importance and equity courts in England assumed supervi- 
sory responsibilities over the management of charitable corporations. 1 T. LEWIN, A PRACTI- 
CAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES 429 (8th ed. 1889). According to Judge 
Oaks, "[Alt the time of the founding of the United States, the English court of chancery and 
attorney general had no general common-law supervisory or regulatory powers over charita- 
ble corporations, and that their jurisdiction to intervene in the application of corporate 
revenues was limited to correcting embezzlements." Oaks, supra note 101, a t  825 (emphasis 
in original). 
IBS Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518,676 (1819); Allen v. Mc- 
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and officers had greater managerial control over the corporation's 
property.ls4 For instance, in dictum in the Dartmouth College case, 
Justice Marshall had noted that, unlike the charitable trust, the 
legal and beneficial interests of the nonprofit corporation are 
lodged in the trustees.185 
Because of the tangled history of the charitable trust in this 
country, jurisdictions differ as to whether a charitable corporation 
holds property conveyed to it absolutely, or whether it holds such 
property in trust.186 The circumstances under which creditors can 
reach the organization's property differ. If a charitable corporation 
incurs a liability in contract or in tort, an action at  law can be 
brought against the corporation. But it  is only in equity, if at all, 
that a creditor can reach trust property.ls7 The income from prop- 
erty bequeathed to a charitable corporation must be used for its 
charitable purposes, yet unlike the charitable trust, it is not sub- 
ject to a statutory rule requiring accountings in a probate court.188 
A charitable corporation does not hold property beneficially in 
the same sense that a business corporation or a non-charitable or- 
ganization would hold it. In St. Joseph's Hospital v. Bennett, the 
New York Court of Appeals stated that a gift to a corporation 
which specified a particular purpose did not create a charitable 
trust, but the corporation could not receive a gift for one purpose 
and use it  for another unless a court applied the doctrine of cy 
pres.180 
The legal differences in the trust or corporate form are not nec- 
Kean, 1 F. Cas. 489,497-98 (1833); Nelson v. Cushing, 56 Mass. (2 Cush.) 519,532 (1848). J. 
KENT, supra note 46, a t  *304-05. According to Oaks, supra note 101, a t  841-50, a t  common 
law the attorney general's powers to enforce charitable corporations differed from and were 
more tenuous than their powers over charitable trusts. 
18' See, e.g., Parker v. May, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 336 (1850). 
lS5 17 U.S. a t  654. 
lee 4 A. SCOW supra note 9, a t  3348.1. 
lS7 Id. 
lBe RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, a t  § 348. 
lee St. Joseph's Hospital v. Bennett, 281 N.Y. 115, 115, 123, 22 N.E. 305, 308 (1939). 
See also Queen of Angels Hospital v. Younger, 66 Cal. App. 3rd 359, 136 Cal. Rptr. 36 
(1977). Cf. CAL. CORP. CODE 3 9143 (West 1985) (providing cause of action for a contributor 
when property received by the corporation has been used in a manner contrary to the spe- 
cific purpose for which i t  was contributed.) 
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essarily consistent. In some jurisdictions, a devise of land to a char- 
itable corporation may be prohibited or restricted, and the powers 
of a charitable trustee to hold property may be correspondingly 
broader.leO Yet, under common law the charitable trustee could not 
mortage property, whereas the charitable corporation could 
mortage or dispose of property without seeking approval.lol 
A major distinction between the two organizational forms is that 
the charitable corporation is organized under legislative authority 
whereas the charitable trust is established by private action.le2 Be- 
cause of statutory requirements on such matters as dissolution, 
number of directors, and corporate housekeeping requirements, the 
internal organization of the charitable trust may be more informal 
and flexible. In some circumstances, however, the trustee's require- 
ments may be more rigid. Absent a provision in the trust instru- 
ment, a charitable trustee may need court approval to resign. Some 
of the common law requirements of non-profit corporations can be 
altered through creative drafting. 
3. Business Corporations and Charitable Corporation Law 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the essential nature 
of the business corporation changed from unique, ad hoc creations, 
vesting exclusive control over a public asset or natural resource in 
one group of favorites, to the typical mode for organizing a 
business.193 
The development of the business corporation in the United 
lD0 In Wyoming a charitable corporation can only acquire property "such as may be 
necessary or proper for the purposes of such corporation." WYO. STAT. $17-7-103 (1977). 
Other states restrict the amount of property that can be owned. See ARK. STAT. ANN. 3 50- 
201 (1947); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 8 1715.39 (Page 1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, 3 563 
(West 1951). Nevada limits a charitable corporation's ownership of real estate to one block 
in any town or city and ten acres in the country. NEV. REV. STAT. 86.160 (1979). 
la' Fisch, supm note 175, a t  893. 
lea A charitable trust is created either by a testamentary or inter vivos transfer of prop- 
erty by the ovmer to a trustee for charitable purposes. It comes into existence when the 
settlor who indicated an intention to create a trust delivers a trust for charitable purposes 
for the benefit of indefinite beneficiaries. Fisch, supra note 175, a t  875. 
lD3 L. FRIEDMAN, supm note 68, a t  168-69. 
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States has been viewed as the transfer of the public service func- 
tions from traditional charitable organizations (churches and 
schools), to internal improvement corporations (railroads, coach, 
bridges, water supply companies), to wholly private business cor- 
porations that exploited an anonymous market.le4 The business 
corporation provided the engine of organization for a market 
economy. 
In the first half of the nineteenth century, the essential public 
service nature of the business corporation changed and diverged 
from the traditional charitable corporation. Because of easier ac- 
cess of entry through general incorporation statutes, unlimited du- 
ration, and a relaxation of restrictions on purposes, capital require- 
ments, and management, the business corporation became the 
general form in which to cast the organization of one's business.lO" 
Even during the early 18007s, it was realized that different kinds 
of public service organizations required varying degrees of state 
regulation. Yet, charitable corporations received little further at- 
tention once general incorporation statues were passed.lee At the 
turn of the nineteenth century, the case law on corporations was 
thin.le7 As the business corporation became more common, so did 
case law involving it. The prior law which might apply equally to 
the charitable or private corporation was no longer germane.les 
Business corporations, whose function was to carry on business 
for profit, inevitably bred more litigation than incorporated 
churches, colleges, or orphanages. Commencing in the early nine- 
teenth century, with the growing number of business corporations 
there was a corresponding increase in litigation which raised im- 
portant issues of corporate law.lee The rules of nonprofit corpora- 
tions were ill-suited to business corporations and rules relating to 
non-stock entities were of little assistance in dealing with such 
nineteenth century corporate issues as the liability of shareholders 
l" R. SEAVOY, supra note 74, at 5-7; W. NELSON, supra note 27, at 133. 
' 
lg5 L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 18, at 168-69. 
lBB R. SEAVOY, supra note 74, at 255. 
lm L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 18, at 175. 
le8 W. NELSON, supra note 27, at 133-34. 
lS8 E. DODD, supra note 123, at 12. 
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to pay assessments, methods of transferring shares, or the rights of 
shareholders in earnings and assets of the corporation.200 Thus, the 
law of business corporations as it developed in the nineteenth cen- 
tury diverged from that of the charitable corporation. 
In some areas, however, nonprofit law was greatly influenced by 
business corporate developments. Business corporate principles 
were applied to the internal governance of nonprofit corporations, 
but trust law governed the fiduciary responsibilities of directors 
and officers of nonprofit corporations. Nonprofit corporation law 
converged with business corporation law in the twentieth century. 
In some jurisdictions, nonprofit corporation statutes literally 
tracked their business corporate counterparts.201 Nowhere did non- 
profit corporation law develop according to its specific needs. 
Increasingly, nonprofit corporation law reflected business corpo- 
rate rather than trust principles in solving charitable corporate 
problems. Courts and statutes long have applied corporate stan- 
dards to matters dealing with internal administrative management 
or housekeeping functions of charitable corporations.202 Unlike the 
charitable trust, but similar to the business corporation, litigation 
is conducted in the name of the corporation rather than the name 
of the individual directors.203 Contracts are executed in the name 
of the corporation rather than the directors, and the corporation 
can borrow money in its name. The rules governing charitable cor- 
poration bylaws, internal procedures, and qualification and renewal 
of board members are based upon business corporate rather than 
trust principles.204 
Procedures and practices relating to financial investments and 
'On Id. a t  195-96. 
lo' Compare N.Y. NOT-POR-PROFIT. CORP. LAW ( ~ c ~ i n n e ~  1970 and 1984-85 Supp.) 
with N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW (McKinney 1963 and 1984-85 Supp.). 
'Oa "Corporate principles are applied to the solution of such [administrative] problems 
with remarkable uniformity by the courts of all states, regardless of whether they adhere to 
the trust theory or the theory of absolute ownership for other purposes." W. CARY & C. 
BRIGHT, supra note 5, a t  19. 
log Note, supra note 8, a t  1173. 
lM Grace v. Grace Inst., 19 N.Y.2d 307,313, 279 N.Y.S. 721,724, 226 N.E.2d 531, 533 
(1967); Leeds v. Harrison, 9 N.J. 202,87 A.2d 713 (1952); W. CARY & C. BRIGHT, supra note 
5, a t  24. 
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management of charitable estates have become more flexible in re- 
cent years.206 Even before the adoption by some states of the Uni- 
form Management of Institutional Funds Act, corporate principles 
were applied to financial investment policies and formal adminis- 
tration of charitable corporations.20e The board of directors of the 
charitable corporation has had broader powers of delegation than 
trustees of the charitable trust. For instance, charitable corpora- 
tions could delegate supervisory powers of investment to external 
sources.207 Nor did the directors of a charitable corporation have to 
limit investments to a legal list like that governing investment de- 
cisions by trustees.208 
4. The Need for Nonprofit Corporation Law to Reflect the 
Charitable Sector's Diversity and Requirements 
The law of charitable corporations has developed so that it is a 
hybrid of trust and corporate principles. Courts and statutes have 
favored charities and their property. The words of Cary and Bright 
written fifteen years ago ring true today: "An examination of the 
cases makes it clear that the choice of principles depends upon the 
factual situation presented and upon the result which the courts 
deem it socially desirable to attain.''20D 
In matters of internal administration and financial management, 
the movement to corporate principles is salutory. The growth in 
size and complexity of the modern charitable organization has led 
to an increasing adandonment of the use of the charitable trust, 
particularly as the nonprofit corporation increasingly resembles its 
corporate counterpart. 
See Cary & Bright, The "Income" of Endowment Funds, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 396 
(1969); Cary & Bright, The Delegation of Investment Responsibility for Endowment Funds 
74 COLUM. L. REV. 207 (1974); UNW. MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS A m ,  7 A  U.L.A. 
411 (1972). 
W .  CARY & C. BRIGHT, supra note 5, at 26-27. 
a07 Attorney Gen. v. Olson, 346 Mass. 190, 191 N.E.2d 132 (1963). See Stern v. Lucy 
Webb Hayes Nat'l Training School, 381 F.Supp. 1003 (D.D.C. 1974)(liiiting the powers of 
delegation); RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, at $ 379 comment b. 
'OB RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, at 8 389 comment b. 
zOs W .  CARY & C. BRIGHT, supra note 5, at 18. 
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Yet, the "trust-corporate standard" dichotomy has often cen- 
tered on the label to be applied, rather than upon an analysis of 
the corporate problem involved. Too often, the selection of the la- 
bel has determined the result. At other times, the label has been 
used as a convenient rationalization of a socially desirable result 
without analysis of the principles involved.210 
This approach takes into account neither the differences or spe- 
cial needs of nonprofit corporations, nor the dissimilarities within 
the nonprofit sector. The new California Nonprofit Law211 and pro- 
posed revision of the ABA's Model Nonprofit Corporation Act are 
welcome developments. Still, most nonprofit corporate statutes re- 
flect the colorful words of Henn and Boyd: "Nonprofit organiza- 
tions have been the neglected stepchildren of modern organization 
law. The law historically has given nonprofit organizations, like 
Cinderellas, the hand-me-downs of their half-siblings, the business 
 organization^."^^^ The remainder of this article shall examine some 
areas where nonprofit corporate law should be reformed to reflect 
the diversity and needs of nonprofit corporations. 
A. The Classification of Nonprofit Corporations - The Need for 
a Close Corporation Analogue 
1. Classification by Relationship to Patrons 
There is no uniform classification scheme or generally accepted 
typology of nonprofit organizations. Only recently have there been 
attempts to develop a theoretical rationale for the nonprofit sec- 
tor.213 In a seminal article on nonprofit corporations, Professor 
Howard Hansmann used an economic perspective to divide all cor- 
"O Id. at 15. 
See CAL. CORP. CODE $3 5000-10831 (West. Supp. 1980). 
111 See Henn & Boyd, Statutory Trends in the Law of Nonprofit Organizations: Cali- 
fornia, Here We Come!, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1103, 1104 (1981). 
See Hansmann, Reforming, supra note 6; Hansmann, Role, supra note 6; Ellman, 
Another Theory of Nonprofit Corporations, 80 MICH. L. REV. 999 (1982); Ben-Ner, A The- 
ory of Nonprofit Organizations (Yale Program on Nonprofit Organizations, Working Paper 
No. 51, April 1982). 
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porations into three categories: business corporations, cooperative 
corporations, and nonprofit corporations, each of which was de- 
fined by a different relationship between the organization and its 
patrons (donors).214 Hansmann developed four ideal typologies of 
non-profits: 1) donative - those organizations such as CARE or 
the American Red Cross, who receive the bulk of their income 
from relatively unrestrictive donations; 2) commercial - those or- 
ganizations, such as nonprofit day care centers, nursing homes and 
hospitals, as well as consumers' unions, who obtain most of their 
money from prices charged for goods or services they produce; 3) 
mutual - organizations such as social clubs or Common Cause, 
controlled by their patrons; and 4) entrepreneurial organizations 
such as hospitds or those organized for relief of the poor, which 
are not controlled by their patrons.215 Hansmann's approach may 
be a misstep in the right direction. Though one may differ with his 
perception of the nonprofit corporation, he offers perhaps the first 
coherent theory of the charitable sector. 
2. Classification Under the Internal Revenue Code 
0 
The size and attractiveness of the nonprofit form of organization 
today rests upon its exemption, complete or partial, from income 
taxation under the Internal Revenue Code.216 Under subchapter F 
of the Internal Revenue Code, full or partial exemption from in- 
come taxation is granted to several types of organizations under 
separate subsections.217 The various categories of tax exempt orga- 
nizations in subchapter F are not the result of any planned legisla- 
*I4 Hansmann, Reforming, supra note 6, a t  597. 
*I0 Id. a t  502-04. Hansmann's model is criticized in Ellman, supra note 213. Professor 
Oleck divides nonprofit corporations into six categories: charitable organizations; social or- 
ganizations; political organizations; trade associations; mixed business-nonprofit organiza- 
tions; and governmental organizations. H. OLECK, supra note 3, a t  51-52. 
The Internal Revenue Code exempts a wider range of groups than solely those 
traditional charities which serve a public benefit. Other exempt organization which are oper- 
ated primarily for the benefit of their members-mutual benefit organizations-are granted 
tax exemption as well. Bittker and Rahdert, supra note 106, a t  301-02. 
'I7 P. TREUSCH & N. SUGARMAN, supra note 107, a t  16; Bittker and Rahdert, supra note 
106, a t  302. One cannot overestimate the importance of tax exemption and of the Internal 
Revenue Code for nonprofits. One typically refers to the kind of organization by the applica- 
ble section of the Code. 
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tive scheme but were enacted through the years "by a variety of 
legislators for a variety of reasons."218 Within the category of ex- 
empt organizations, the Code provides for differing tax treat- 
ment.21e In this article, we have focused upon "public" charities 
classified under Section 501 (c) (3).220 
3. State Statutory Approaches 
Most nonprofit organizations are incorporated. States have used 
diverse schemes for categorizing nonprofit corporations. Some have 
followed the approach of the Model Nonprofit Corporation 
which parallels the provisions of the Model Business Corporation 
The Model Act offers a series of permissible purpose~,2~~ or, 
McGovern, supra note 105, a t  524. 
A few are exempt regardless of the nature of their income. Others may lose exempt 
status on receiving income from proscribed sources; some may lose their exemption if they 
engage in specific political activity. Most are taxed on unrelated business income. There are 
other distinctions among the many kinds of exempt organizations listed under Section 
501(c) and other such sections. Bittker and Rahdert, supra note 106, a t  302. 
The most desirable categories of exemption are "public" charities organized and op- 
erated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific testing, public safety. literary, or educa- 
tional purposes. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (West Supp. 1985). "Public" charities are those with 
broad public support as defined in I.R.C. 3 509(a)(2) (West Supp. 1985). Section 501(c)(3) 
organizations which fail to qunlifv as "public" charities and are classified as private founda- 
tions are subject to additional restrictions and requirements. See I.R.C. 55 507-09,4940-48 
(West Supp. 1985). In addition to exemption from the payment of federal income tax, orga- 
nizations organized as exeinpt under 5 501(c)(3) may also enjoy tax exemption under state 
and local income, property, sales, use or other kids of taxation. Contributions to § 501(c)(3) 
organizations are deductible on the individual or corporate donor's tax returns. I.R.C. § 
170(c) (1978 & West Supp. 1985). S e ~ c e s  performed for a 3 501(c)(3) organization may be 
exempt from social security and unemployment contributions, I.R.C. 3 3121(b)(8)(B) (1978 
& West Supp. 1985), and receive preferred postal rates, 39 C.F.R. 3 3626.134.5 (1974). 
lal MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT (1964) [hereinafter cited as "MODEL ACT"]. 
lPa Id. a t  vii. See Hansmann, Reforming, supra note 6, a t  528-30. The Model Act is 
being revised and will probably result in a statute simiiar to that in California. Professor 
Michael Hone, the principal draftsperson of the California statute, is the chief reporter of 
the Model Act revision group. 
The MODEL ACT states 
Section 4. Purposes 
Corporations may be organized under this Act for any lawful purpose or pur- 
poses,including, without being limited to, any one or more of the following pur- 
. poses: charitable; benevolent; eleemosynary; educational; civic; patriotic; political; 
scientific; agricultural; horticultural; animal husbandry; and professional, comrner- 
cial, industrial or trade association; but labor unions, cooperative organizations, 
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in the alternative, permits incorporation "for any lawful purpose or 
purposes."224 In some states, the nonprofit form is delineated by a 
series of permissible purposes and is limited by a non-distribution 
constraint.226 In other jurisdictions, a chapter of the general corpo- 
ration statute applies to all nonprofit corporations. It is followed 
by chapters for specific types of nonprofits - agricultural corpora- 
tions, educational corporations, cemetery associations, e t ~ . ~ ~ "  One 
jurisdiction, Delaware, has no separate statute for charitable cor- 
porations, but several sections of its unified corporation law apply 
to charities, and the general corporation statute governs.227 Still 
other statutory forms defy clas~ification.~~~ 
New York applies a functional and economic approach to clas- 
sify charitable corporations. Nonprofit corporations may be formed 
for business purposes, but the purpose must not be for pecuniary 
profit or financial benefit. No part of the assets or income can in- 
ure to the benefit of the corporation's members, directors, or of- 
f i c e r ~ . ~ ~ ~  The New York statute creates four categories of nonprofit 
corporations based upon the purpose of the organization and pro- 
vides for differing degrees of regulation.230 
and organizations subject to any of the provisions of the insurance laws of this 
State may not be organized under this Act. 
MODEL ACT $4. 
2zr Alternate Section 4 states: 
"Corporations may be organized under this Act for any lawful purpose or purposes 
except . . . [list if any]" 
MODEL ACT a t  68. 
22a See generally Hansmann, Reforming, supra note 6, a t  553-67. 
H. OLEUK, supra note 3, a t  44-45. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 1702.01-.03 (Page 1985). 
Illinois follows the MODEL ACT for its general nonprofit act and then has provisions for 
specific types of nonprofits. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, 163a (general not for profit corpora- 
tions); $ 164-188.3 (religious corporations); § 201 (education and charitable corporations); § 
661-652f (hospital service corporations); (Smith-Hurd 1970). 
227 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, $5 125, 127, 313 (1983). 
2z8 Henn and Boyd, supra note 212, a t  1107. 
22n N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 102(a)(5), 204 (McKiney 1970 & Supp. 1984- 
85). However, directors and officers are entitled to reasonable compensation. Id. a t  § 
202(a)(12). A corporation may pay interest on its debt, id. a t  § 202(c)(a), on subvention, id. 
a t  504(d), and bonds, id. a t  506(b). It may earn incidental profits but they may not be 
distributed in the form of dividends Id. a t  § 515(a). 
Id. a t  § 201. Purposes. 
(a) A corporation, as defined in subparagraph (5), paragraph (a) of § 102 (Defini- 
tions), may be formed under this chapter as provided in paragraph (b) unless i t  
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Type "A" corporations, the least regulated, are typically civic, 
patriotic, political, social, fraternal, athletic, agricultural, horticul- 
tural, professional, or trade associations. This type of organization 
has members, who are the primary beneficiaries of the organiza- 
tion. Members have the potential power to control the organization 
and to ensure that its nonprofit purposes are achieved.2s1 Members 
in type "A" corporations are most analogous to shareholders of 
business corporations. Type "B" corporations are the most closely 
regulated and are somewhat, although not completely, similar to 
organizations classified under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal 
Revenue Code.232 Type "B" corporations are traditional charitable 
organizations - colleges, hospitals, or symphonies. 
Type "C" corporations reflect an attempt to close a gap under 
may be formed under any other corporate law of this state in which event it may 
not be formed under this chapter unless such other corporate law expressly so 
provides. 
(b) A corporation, of a type and for a purpose or purposes as follows, may be 
formed under this chapter, provided consents required under any other statute of 
this state have been obtained: 
Type A - A not-for-profit corporation of this type may be formed for any lawful 
non-business purpose or purposes including, but not limited to, any one or more 
of the following non-pecuniary purposes: civic, patriotic, political, social, fraternal, 
athletic, agricultural, horticultural, animal husbandry, and for a professional, com- 
mercial, industrial, trade or service association. 
Type B - A not-for-profit corporation of this type may be formed for any one or 
more of the following non-business purposes: charitable, educational, religious, sci- 
entific, literary, cultural or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals. 
Type C - A not-for-profit corporation of this type may be formed for any lawful 
business purpose to achieve a lawful public or quasi-public objective. 
Type D - A not-for-profit corporation of this type may be formed under this 
chapter when such formation is authorized by any other corporate law of this state 
for any business or non-business, or pecuniary or non-pecuniary, purpose or pur- 
poses specified by such other law whether such purpose or purposes are also 
within types A, B, C, above or otherwise. 
For an analysis of $ 201, see 6 F. WHITE, WHITE ON NEW YORK CORPORATIONS, OT-FOR- 
PROFIT CORPORATION LAW § 201 (B. Prunty 13th ed. 1982); Note, supra note 2, a t  775-79. 
For a criticism of New York's classification scheme, see Hansmann, Reforming, supra note 
6, a t  530-35. 
N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW $ 201(b) (McKinney 1970 and Supp. 1984-85); 
Note, supra note 2, a t  776; Reviser's Comment $ 201,14th Interim Report, supra note 2, a t  
101. 
In Bodell v. Ghezzi, 50 A.D.2d 674, 375 N.Y.S.2d 426 (1975), the court held that 
exemption under 3 501(c)(3) did not necessarily qualify i t  as a type "B" nonprofit. 
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New York's previous statute, the Membership Corporation Law.233 
A type "C" corporation is a nonprofit corporation formed for a 
business purpose to achieve a lawful public or quasi-public objec- 
t i ~ e . ~ ~ ~  An example of a type "C" corporation might be a food co- 
operative in a low income community. 
Type "DM corporations are adapters or connectors which enable 
the Not-for-Profit Corporation Law to function as the foundation 
statute if the corporation's power of formation is covered by an- 
other statute.236 For example, the New York Private Housing Fi- 
nance Law encourages private and public participation in the con- 
struction, renewal, and financing of low income h~using.~" The 
lSS The Membership Corporations Law contained no definition of "nonprofit corpora- 
tion." A membership corporation was defined as "a corporation not organized for pecuniary 
profit." N.Y. I~IEM. CORP. LAW 3 2, 1895 N.Y. Laws 559 (repealed 1970). Section 10 of the 
Membership Corporations Law permitted incorporation for "any lawful purpose . . . except 
a purpose for which a corporation may be created under any general [statute other than the 
membership law]." See 6 F. WHITE, supra note 230, a t  5 201.01. Therefore, the Membership 
Corporations Law prevented the formation of a for profit or nonprofit corporation for a 
business purpose. The Stock Corporation Law 1 5, permitted incorporation only for a busi- 
ness purpose. A business purpose meant a profit purpose. As a result, a nonprofit could not 
be formed under the stock corporation statute even if its purposes were exclusively "busi- 
ness" purposes. Note, supra note 2, a t  765. Thus, under prior New York corporate statutes: 
[A] not for profit corporation could not be formed under the Stock Corporation 
Law. A not for profit corporation could be formed under the Membership Corpo- 
rations Law unless i t  was to be formed for a business purpose. If to be formed for 
a business purpose, i t  could not be formed under that statute because i t  would be 
for a purpose for which a corporation could be formed under any other general law 
which phrase included the Stock Corporation Law. The rather strange result of 
this cross-breeding of the concepts of "for profit" and "not for pecuniary profit" 
and "for a business purpose" and "not for a business purpose" was that one could 
form under the Stock Corporation Law a "for profit corporation" for a "business 
purpose" and under the Membership Corporations Law a "not for pecuniary 
profit corporation" for a non-business purpose but one could not form a "not for 
pecuniary profit corporation" (non-profit corporation) for a "business purpose" 
under either law. This condition began to cause problems when non-profit corpo- 
rations in the business area became common. 
Lesher, The Non-Profit Corporation - A Neglected Stepchild Comes of Age, 22 Bus. LAW. 
951, 953-54 (1967). 
' ~ 4  N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW 3 201(b) (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1984-85). 
1s6 6 F. WHITE, supra note 230, 3 201.05. The incorporation and organization of a hous- 
ing development fund company to develop a housing project for persons of low income 
would be an example of a type '9" corporation. See N.Y. PRIV. HOUS. FIN. LAW 5 573 (Mc- 
Kinney 1976). 
N.Y. PRN. HOUS. FIN. LAW $3 11, 11-8 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1984-85). 
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statute permits the organization and incorporation of housing de- 
velopment fund companies to develop housing projects for persons 
with low incomes.237 These corporations are eligible to receive fi- 
nancing from municipal and state sources, but they are bound by 
the nondistribution constraint238 and are organized for the benefit 
of the families who are to reside in the housing they create. The 
formation and some powers - to receive state funds - of a housing 
development funding company are governed by the Private Hous- 
ing Finance Law, but the resulting corporation is bound by the 
Non Profit Corporation Law as a type "D" corporation. 
California's nonprofit corporation law, adopted in 1978 and ef- 
fective in 1980, divides nonprofit organizations into three catego- 
ries: nonprofit public benefit corporations, nonprofit religious cor- 
porations and nonprofit mutual benefit corporations.23Q California's 
classification system reflects the vast diversity in purposes, nature, 
and governance of organizations that comprise the nonprofit sec- 
tor. Nonprofits within each category are separately regulated by 
the statute and differently supervised by the attorney general. 
Public benefit corporations, a category most analogous to 
501(c)(3) organizations, type "B" corporations under the New York 
statute, and more traditional charities, are those that are formed 
for public or charitable purpose, not for the private gain of any 
individual, and have a distribution constraint while operating and 
upon The California statute, which is primarily con- 
cerned with internal governance, places the definitional burden as 
to what is a "public" or "charitable" purpose upon those who form 
public benefit corporations. 
The assumption of the drafters of the California statute was that 
there was no need to define public benefit corporations, since, com- 
Id. at f 573. 
238 Id. at f 573(3)(b). 
2SD See generally Ellman, On Developing a Law of Nonprofit Corporations, 1979 ARIZ. 
ST. L.J. 153 (one o f  the drafters o f  the Cal. Nonprofit Corporation Law traces the issues and 
purposes behind the law); Hone, California's Xew Nonprofit Corporation Law - An.Intro- 
duction and Conceptual Background, 13 U.S.F.L. REV. 733, 738-41 (1979) (defining each 
category); Symposium: California Nonprofit Corporation Law, 13 U.S.F.L. REV. 729 (1979). 
CAL. CORP. CODE f f  5049, 5111, 5130, 5410 (West Supp. 1985). 
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pared to religious corporations and mutual benefit corporations, 
the attorney general has greater jurisdictional authority over pub- 
lic benefit corp0rations,2~l stricter conflict of interest rules a p ~ l y , 2 ~ ~  
members have no proprietary interest in the 0rganization,2~~ no tax 
benefits are conferred in the non-profit statute and their 
purposes, powers and activities may be subject to other statutes. 
The assumption was thus that people would not choose the public 
benefit category if a more' desirable alternative were available.246 
This rationalization is somewhat precious, for the primary reason 
that people select the public benefit form is for the tax exemption 
advantages it brings. 
Religious corporations are those organized primarily or exclu- 
sively for religious purposes and not for private in~rement .2~~ Reli- 
gious corporations are substantially less regulated than public ben- 
efit corporations.247 There are two justifications for less stringent 
supervision: 1) fear of First Amendment entanglements; and 2) 
self-regulation may be more appropriate given the religious corpo- 
ration's unique functions and moral p0sture.2~~ 
Mutual benefit corporations are a residual category under the 
California Code including all corporations which are not public 
benefit corporations or religious ~orporations.2~~ They include 
141 See Abbott and Kornblum, supra note 99, a t  770-85. 
141 CAL. CORP. CODE 3 5233 (West Supp. 1985). 
24S CAL. COW. CODE $5 5049, 5410 (West Supp. 1985). 
244 With the exception of religious corporations, corporations exempt from state taxa- 
tion must be organized as public benefit corporations. CAL. COW. CODE 5 9912(a) (West 
Supp. 1985). 
146 Report of the Assembly Select Committee on Revision of the Nonprofit Corporation 
Code (Aug. 27, 1979) a t  6, quoted in Hone, supra note 239, a t  735. 
248 CAL. COW. CODE $5 5061,9111,9130 (West Supp. 1985). Note that the definition of 
religious corporation is broader than that contained in the Internal Revenue Code which 
limits religious corporations to "churches, their integrated auxiliaries, and conventions or 
associations of churches." I.R.C. 5 6033(a)(2)(A)(i)(1984). This point is discussed in Hone, 
supra note 239, a t  739-40. The courts will be burdened with defining what is a religion. 
247 Compare CAL. COW. CODE $$ 9240-51 (religious corporations) with CAL CORP. CODE 
$8 5230-41 (public benefit corporations). 
148 See Abbott and Kornblum, supra note 99, a t  790. There is another reason: there 
was no consensus among the draftiig committee and representatives of religious bodies as to 
how much regulation of secular affairs should be imposed on religious corporations. Id. 
CAL. COW. CODE $$ 5059, 9912(a)(5) (West Supp. 1985). 
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trade associations, fraternal organizations, and activities which 
provide some benefit to their members. They cannot make distri- 
butions to members except upon dissolution.260 With the one ex- 
ception of charitable trusts, mutual benefit corporations are less 
regulated by the attorney general and have more liberal provisions 
relating to self-dealing by directors.261 The theory behind less regu- 
lation is that mutual benefit corporations resemble business corpo- 
rations in terms of internal monitoring and control. Their mem- 
bers, similar in many ways to shareholders, will ensure that 
directors carry out their fiduciary duties and that the organization 
properly pursues its purposes. 
The California approach is salutory, although there are some 
definitional ambiguities as to the particular categories in which 
nonprofits will fit.262 The revised Model Non Profit Corporation 
Law will reflect the California approach. However, all of the statu- 
tory classification schemata focus upon a functional analysis of the 
purposes and activities of the organization and ignore structural 
differences in methods of actual operation and rationales for 
existence. 
Many nonprofit organizations incorporate and seek tax exempt 
status solely to be eligible for foundation grants. Such incorpora- 
tors have little knowledge of or interest in corporate practices. The 
advantage of limited liability is less important than in the business 
corporate sector. State and federal filing requirements for exempt 
organizations have taken into account differences in economic size, 
but there has been no attempt to accommodate standard corporate 
procedures and governance rules to the informalities that permeate 
smaller nonprofit corporations. 
Beyond the debate as to the most appropriate classification 
scheme for nonprofits, an unaddressed issue is whether all non- 
profit corporations should have similar requirements for corporate 
governance. Many nonprofit corporations, particularly smaller or- 
loo Id. at $ 7411. 
lo' Compare CAL. COW. CODE §§ 7230-38 (mutual benefit) with CAL. COW. CODE $8 
5230-38 (public benefit). See Basile, Directors' Liability Under the New California Non- 
profit Corporation Law, 13 U.S.F.L. REV. 891, 906-09 (1979). 
See Hansmann, Reforming, supra note 6, at 535-37. 
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ganizations, ignore directors' statutory responsibilities and corpo- 
rate formalities. Does it make sense to have the same corporate 
requirements for all sizes of nonprofit corporations? Should differ- 
ing corporations, united ,only by the proscription against private 
inurement and their desire to obtain an exemption from income 
tax, be treated by state corporation statutes in the same way? 
In the business corporate setting, the law has recognized that 
smaller corporations, ones with fewer shareholders, have special 
needs and methods of operating. These organizations, called close 
corporations, resemble partnerships in the way business is con- 
ducted. They tend to have an integration of ownership and man- 
agement and few shareholders.253 Close corporations are character- 
ized by an informality of management and often by a failure to 
follow normal corporate procedures.254 
4. The Close Nonprofit Corporation 
There is a need for a nonprofit equivalent to the close corpora- 
t i ~ n . ~ ~ ~  While incorporation is not a requirement to gain tax ex- 
empti0n,2~~ most nonprofits incorporate prior to seeking section 
501(c)(3) status. Nonprofit organizations often have little concept 
of the norms of corporate behavior or principles of corporate gov- 
ernance. Many organizations have only the statutory minimum 
1w There is no single generally accepted definition of the close corporation. The term is 
used to emphasize an integration of ownership and management in which the shareholders 
occupy management positions. There is no established market for the corporation's stock. 
The close corporation is more functionally related to the partnership than the corporation. 
See W. GARY & hl. EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS 377 (5th ed. 1980); 1 F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPO- 
RATIONS $8 1.02, 1.07 (1971). 
lM See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975). 
For a case applying close corporation principles to a charitable corporation, see 
American Center for Educ., Inc. v. Cavner, 80 Cal. App. 3d 476, 145 Cal. Rptr. 736 (1978). 
las An unincorporated association is recognized as eligible for tax exempt status under 
8 501(c)(3). An unincorporated nonprofit association that has a constitution, bylaws, and 
elected o5cers is treated as a corporation under the statute. Blake v. Comm'r, 29 T.C.M. 
513 (1970); Morey v. Riddel, 205 F. Supp. 918 (S.D. Cal. 1962); John T. Blake, T.C. Memo 
1970-117, 29 T.C. M. 513 (1970). Cf. I.R.C. $ 7701(a)(3) (1984) (defining "Corporation" for 
Code purposes). An unincorporated association that has neither an organizing instrument, 
governing rules, nor a defined method of operation will not qualify as an exempt organiza- 
tion under I.R.C. $ 501(c)(3). Trippe v. Comm'r, 9 T.C.M. 622 (1950). 
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number of directors, all of whom are employees with a strong de- 
sire for employee-director control. These inside directors adopt the 
corporate form of organization only for its tax exempt status and 
for revenue purposes. In their relationships to each other, the par- 
ticipants are more analogous to partners. The formalities of corpo- 
rate governance are ignored. The corporate form is but a vehicle to 
solicit charitable contributions. The finances,of such organizations 
are particularly parlous. Self-dealing and private inurement are 
common, yet the costs and difficulties of enforcing fiduciary stan- 
dards are enormous, and, for all practical purposes, are impossible. 
Small close corporations necessarily are unregulated. Creating a 
category of nonprofit close corporations would reflect the realities 
of much of the charitable sector. 
The close nonprofit corporation would have the definitional 
characteristics of an integration of directors and employees and an 
upper level of permitted assets. A certain percentage of budget al- 
locations for salaries of st& and directors might be another indica- 
tor of close corporation s t a t ~ s . 2 ~ ~  Most importantly, the close non- 
profit corporation would be eligible for classification under section 
501(c)(3) and section 170(c) of the Internal Revenue Code. This 
would enable these organizations to receive funds from patrons 
and the government and would give the organization the cherished 
"determination letter".268 
The private inurement proscription and restrictions on the dis- 
tribution of assets upon dissolution would remai11.2~~ For tax and 
State and federal filing requirements for nonprofit. also vary depending upon the 
receipts of the organization. For example, I.R.C. 3 6033 requires an annual return on Form 
990, Return of Organization Exempt From Income Tax, for organizations exempt from tax 
under I.R.C. 3 501(a) except for religious organizations and organizations that have annual 
gross receipts of not more than $25,000. An asset limitation may be somewhat analogous to 
close corporation legislation which defines a close corporation according to a maximum 
number of shareholders. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 5 342(a)(1) (1974) (30 share- 
holders). 
aOB The determination letter is a ruling issued by the National O5ce of the Internal 
Revenue Service for recognition of exemption. See Rev. Proc. 80-25, 1980-1 C.B. 667. Pro- 
spective patrons of a nonprofit organization, particularly if the patron is a private founda- 
tion, will request as a part of the application process a copy of the determination letter. It is 
the most important indicator of nonprofit status. 
llB Treas. Reg. $ 1.501(~)(3)-l(b)(4),-1(~)(2) (1976). 
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corporate law purposes, the close nonprofit corporation would be 
treated as an incorporated partnership. The receipt of funds from 
patrons or governmental donors would be treated as partnership 
income, yet such income would not be taxed so long as the income 
and monies dispersed for salaries and expenses were reasonable. 
Enforcement would rest upon state and federal tax authorities. 
This approach would remove from the nonprofit sector and from 
attorney general supervision thousands of small nonprofit corpora- 
tions that ignore corporate formalities and may be too insignificant 
to monitor, given scarce resources. The close nonprofit corporation 
would recognize that in many small nonprofit organizations self- 
dealing that is inappropriate in the context of large, for-profit busi- 
ness corporations is crucial for the small, closely held organiza- 
tion's surv i~al .2~~ 
The close nonprofit corporation would reflect the informality 
that exists in so much of the nonprofit world. Liability for the mis- 
use of public monies and the advantages of tax exempt status 
would shift directly to the individuals in the organization and away 
from an artifically separated board of direct0rs.2~~ 
B. Improving State Regulation of Charitable Organizations 
1. Supervision of Charitable Corporations-Standing Limitations 
All commentators on the subject agree that there is inadequate 
supervision of nonprofit corporations.202 In the United States, su- 
260 "Conflicts of interest," in the sense of transactions between directors or officers and 
their nonprofit corporation, abound in the nonprofit sector. Patterns of interested transac- 
tions parallel business corporate practices. In many situations interested transactions are a 
healthy necessity. They may provide access to resources unavailable from the commercial 
marketplace. The financial status of the nonprofit corporation may be so poor that market 
sources of credit or supplies are unattainable. The loan of money, of goods, or of services, 
may be available only from an interested director who is concerned with the organization's 
welfare. In other situations, the interested transaction is unethical or illegal and in violation 
of the director's duty of loyalty to the corporation and to the public. 
281 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 3 350 (1974); MD. CORPS. AND ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 4- 
303 (1975); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW 3 620(f) (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1984-85)(al1 relieving 
directors of liability when close corporation status is elected and imposing upon the share- 
holders the liability for managerial acts or omission normally imposed on directors). 
262 Abrams, supra note 3, a t  484; M. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 11, a t  226-28; 
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pervision of charities has long been exercised by the state attorney 
general or, in a few jurisdictions, by a district attorney.26s Usually 
suit is brought by the attorney general on his own initiative, but in 
a few states suit may be brought by the attorney general on the 
relation of, or the information of, a third person.264 That person is 
called a "relator."266 
Attorneys general have a multiplicity of responsibilities and ex- 
tremely limited resources. In 1977, only eight states assigned attor- 
neys full time to the enforcement of charitable trusts and regula- 
tion of charitable corporations. Eleven states had no attorneys 
assigned, while most had one or two attorneys assigned part- 
time.266 Given the thousands of nonprofit corporations, the lack of 
resources devoted to monitoring means charitable organizations 
are for all practical purposes self-regulated. While directors of 
charitable corporations generally have standing to sue, they rarely 
bring derivative suits. Members of charitable corporations may 
have standing to However, many nonprofit corporations are 
Hansmann, Reforming, supra note 6, a t  600-06; Karst, supra note 5, a t  434, 449-53, 476. 
Even before the Statute of Charitable Uses, the attorney general had the responsibility to 
enforce the purposes of charitable organizations. 4 A. SCOTT, supra note 9, a t  $ 391. Accord- 
ing to Blackstone, the source of the attorney general's power was the monarch as parens 
patriae who had general superintendence of all charities. This oversight was exercised 
through the throne's chief aide, the Chancellor. Whenever i t  was necessary to enforce a 
charity, the attorney general "at the relation of some informant (who was usually called the 
relator), filed ex officio an information in the Court of Chancery to have the charity properly 
established." 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 122, a t  *427. 
le3 G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, supra note 9, a t  $ 411. 
lM Id. See Brown v. Memorial Nat'l Home Found., 162 Cal. App. 2d 513,329 P.2d 118 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1958); Sarkeys v. Independent School. Dist., 592 P.2d 534 (Okla. 1979). 
les The relator did not exist a t  common law but was a creature of the Statute of Anne, 
9 Anne, ch. 20 (1710). That act provided that i t  should be lawful "for the proper officer, by 
leave of the court, to exhibit an information in the nature of a quo warranto a t  the relation 
of any person desiring to prosecute the same." The statute was adopted in toto by some 
states. Newman v. United States, 238 U.S. 537,544 (1914). Jurisdictions di ier  on the proce- 
dures to be followed to institute an action on behalf of a relator and regarding whether the 
Attorney General can control an action once brought. 
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATPORNEYS GENERAL, STATE REGULATION OF CHARITABLE 
TRUSTS AND SOLICITATIONS 8 (1977). 
le7 See CAL. CORP. CODE $5 5420,7420,7710 (West Supp. 1980); N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT 
CORP. LAW $3 623(a), 720(b)(3) (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1984-85); Hansmann, Reforming, 
supra note 6, a t  606 (while most statutes are silent on standing questions, they generally 
adopt charitable trust rules). Some state courts have given standing to members; others 
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non-membership corporations with self-perpetuating boards. For 
this latter sort of organization only the attorney general or a direc- 
tor has standing to s ~ e . 2 ~ ~  
Under trust and corporate principles, the public has no standing 
to sue absent a specific statutory grant. The rationale is that prop- 
erty is devoted to the accomplishment of purposes which are bene- 
ficial to the community at  large, rather than to a specific person.2Bv 
Even a specific beneficiary of a charity is but an intermediary 
through whom the public advantage is achieved. Therefore, en- 
forcement of charitable purposes is undertaken by the attorney 
general on behalf of the p ~ b l i c . 2 ~ ~  A more practical reason for de- 
nying the public standing is that the persons benefited by charities 
are usually members of a large and shifting class of the public. If 
any member of that class had standing, the charity would be sub- 
jected to much unnecessary l i t igati~n.~~'  
Traditional standing limitations occasionally have been relaxed 
in matters of public importance that relate to charities.272 The gen- 
- - 
have not. Compare Leeds v. Hanson, 7 N.J. Super. 558, 72 A.2d 371 (1950) with Voeller v. 
St. Louis Merchantile Library Ass'n, 359 S.W.2d 689 (Mo. 1962). 
2e8 See N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROPIT CORP. LAW $8 720(c), 112 (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1984- 
85). 
lee 4 A. SCOTT, supra note 9, a t  4 364; Tushnet, The New Law of Standing, 62 CORNELL 
L. REV. 663, 675 (1977). 
G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, supra note 9, a t  5 54 (quoting I n  re Pruner's Estate, 
390 Pa. 529, 136 A.2d 107 (1957)). 
Id. a t  5 411. 
See Fitzgerald v. Baxter State Park, 385 A.2d 189 (Me. 1978) (Land was conveyed 
to the state as a trust for a state park. The park authority and attorney general as members 
of former trustees were to carry out the purposes of the trust. Plaintiffs as Maine citizens 
and users of park were given standing to sue); Gordon v. City of Baltimore, 258 Md. 682, 
267 A.2d 98 (1970) (taxpayer had standing to sue to prevent transfer by charitable corpora- 
tion of its library to another corporation so that city of Baltimore would support library); 
Jones v. Grant, 344 So. 2d 1210 (Ala. 1977) (faculty, st&, and students had standing to 
bring class action against president and board of directors for misuse of funds); Parson v. 
Walker, 28 Ill. App. 3d 517,328 N.E.2d 920 (1975) (citizens have standing to oppose devia- 
tion of gift of land made to state university for park); Patterson v. Patterson General Hospi- 
tal, 99 N.J. Super. 514,235 A.2d 487 (1967) (residents of city and taxpayers had standing to 
sue to prevent relocation of hospital). But see Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 
426 U.S. 26 (1976) (indigents had no standing to maintain an action against the Secretary of 
the Treasury and Internal Revenue Service in order to set aside a ruling that a nonprofit 
hospital was exempt from taxation even though i t  did not provide free or below-cost services 
to the poor); Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat'l Training School for Deaconesses and Mission- 
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eral rule, however, remains that, absent a statutory right, there is 
no private enforcement of a charitable trust, a nonprofit trust, or a 
nonprofit corporation. Nor should any member of the public have 
standing to sue. The effects of a suit on a charitable organization 
are often even more severe than those typically resulting for a bus- 
iness corporation or an individual. Publicity generated by the mere 
filing of the suit may dry up sources of funds. The reputation of 
the organization may never recover. Nevertheless, the enforcement 
problem remains, and abuses do occur. 
Twenty-five years ago, Professor Kenneth Karst suggested that a 
state board of private charities be established on the English. 
m0de1.2~~ Today, we live in an age of deregulation. There are few 
who believe that another agency with additional resources is a suf- 
ficient cure for any social ill. The effectiveness of regulatory efforts 
will have to come from other sources. 
2. Increasing the Use of Relators 
Expanding the use of relators could complement attorney gen- 
eral enforcement yet avoid the dangers of broadened standing by 
members of the public. The resources needed for the effective reg- 
ulation of nonprofits are great. The use of relators offers a struc- 
ture of costs and benefits preferable to expanded government 
regulation. 
A relator is a party who may or may not have a direct interest in 
a transaction, but is permitted to institute a proceeding in the 
name of the people when that right to sue resides solely in the 
attorney This use of relators is derived from the quo 
aries, 367 F. Supp. 536, 540 (D.D.C. 1973) (patients of hospital certified as a class under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) for purposes of seeking injunctive relief in advance of damages to be 
paid into hospital funds. Certification denied under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3), which might 
entitle patients to receive monetary recovery); Christiansen v. National Savings and Trust 
Co., 683 F.2d 520 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (subscribers of health plan did not have standing to en- 
force director's fiduciary duties). 
Karst, supra note 5, a t  476-83. 
Brown v. Memorial Nat'l Home Found., 162 Cal. App. 2d 513, 329 P.2d 118, cert. 
denied, 358 U.S. 943 (1958). 
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warranto proceeding.27K Usually a relator must have a direct inter- 
est in the matter of the proceeding. Jurisdictions differ regarding 
whether a relator must seek permission of a court in order to bring 
suit and the formal status the relator occupies as a party to the 
litigation.276 State statutory approaches differ greatly. Some juris- 
dictions have incorporated the quo warranto action under other la- 
bels while enforcing statutory requirements relating to corpora- 
tions. Typically, these actions are brought by the attorney general 
for involtintary dissolution of a corporation or failure to adhere to 
the terms of corporate franchi~e.~?? 
276 QUO warranto is an extraordinary civil proceeding whereby the state demands that 
an individual or corporation show by what right some franchise or privilege has been 
granted by the state. Quo warranto can be resorted to only when the act or wrong com- 
plained of does injury to the public. See generally 5 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW 
OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS $3 2324-29 (rev. per. ed. 1976). In most American jurisdictions, 
there are constitutional or statutory provisions for the exercise of this remedy. Quo warranto 
can be an appropriate proceeding to challenge the validity and legality of a corporation's 
existence, to remedy usurpation, misuse, abuse, or nonuse of franchises or privileges, to 
reach criminal or illegal acts, to oust corporate officers, or to try title to a corporate office. 
Id. a t  $ 2330. The theory of this use of quo warranto is that corporations have been granted 
a franchise from the legislature and that the usurpation of the corporate office or improper 
activities by the officers or directors is a violation of the privilege granted by the state. Quo 
warranto has been used against charitable corporations. See cases cited id. a t  $ 2332 nn.17- 
20. 
There are three variations: 1) the relator may appear as an ordinary party plaintiff 
and bring suit in his own name; 2) the state may be the nominal party plaintiff with the 
relator suing in the name of the state, formally appearing in the title as relator; and 3) the 
public attorney may appear as relator. In the latter situation, the role of the private party 
may be as active as a nominal party p la in t s  would be or as passive as the complaining 
witness in a criminal matter. Annot., 51 A.L.R. 2d 1306, 1309 (1957). 
177 Several jurisdictions have enacted legislation, derived from quo warranto proce- 
dures, that affects nonprofit corporations. Typically these are actions for involuntary disso- 
lution of the corporation, brought by the attorney general or other state official as a result of 
violation of the nonprofit corporation statute. See ARK. STAT. ANN. $64-1917 (1980) (procur- 
ing incorporation through fraud); GA. CODE ANN. $14-3-217 (Michie 1982) (failure to file an 
annual report); IDAHO CODE $ 30-1-94 (1980) (procuring incorporation through fraud); ILL. 
ANN. STAT. ch. 32, $ 163a 49,50 (Smith-Hurd 1973 & Supp. 1984-85 ) (answering interroga- 
tories falsely and fraudulent solicitation of money); IND. CODE, ANN. $ 23-7-1.1-66 (Burns 
1981) (deadlock); IOWA CODE ANN. $ 504A.53 (West Supp. 1981) (exceeding or abusing au- 
thority); 1981 Ky. Rev. Stat. & R. Sew. $ 273.320 (Baldwin) (acts detrimental to the inter- 
ests and welfare of people); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13B, $ 1105 (1969) (assets misapplied or 
wasted); MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. $ 1-405 (1975) (illegal conduct connected with 
organized crime); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 180, $ 11B (West Supp. 1981) (inactive and in 
public interest); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. $ 450.1821 (West 1973) (conducting business in an 
unlawful manner). 
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Some jurisdictions complement the state regulation of charities 
by allowing relators to file with the attorney general informations 
alleging abuses by charitable organizations. In this situation, the 
suit may be brought by the attorney general or on relation of a 
third person, who need not have a direct interest in the matter. 
The attorney general, rather than the relator, has control over the 
conduct of the lawsuit, but the relator is liable for costs, which 
otherwise would have to be paid by the ~ t a t e . 2 ~ ~  Relator status has 
been granted in the nonprofit context to bar asso~iations,2~~ tax- 
payer~,2~O cemetery plot h0lders,2~' directors of other state depart- 
ments,2s2 and members of a social ~ 1 u b . 2 ~ ~  
One jurisdiction where an expanded use of relator status has 
complemented the attorney general's regulation of charities is Cali- 
f ~ r n i a . ~ ~ ~  According to regulations promulgated by the California 
attorney general, the relator submits to the attorney general an ap- 
plication for leave to sue, a verified complaint, and a statement of 
facts as to why the proposed proceeding should be brought in the 
name of the state and under the state's If the attor- 
ney general grants the application, the relator must post a five 
hundred dollar bond and agree to pay for any costs and expenses 
recovered against the Importantly, the attorney general 
controls the action at  all times, and can at any stage of the pro- 
ceeding withdraw, discontinue, or dismiss the action or assume the 
proceeding's 
An expanded use of relator status based on the California ap- 
278 Sarkeys v. Independent School Dist. No. 40, 592 P.2d 529, 534 (Okla. 1979); G.G. 
BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, supra note 9, a t  3 411. 
17* People ex rel. L.A. Bar Assoc. v. California Protective Corp., 76 Cal. App. 2d 354, 
244 P. 1089 (1926). 
lao People v. Thompson, 101 Ill. App. 2d 104, 242 N.E.2d 49 (1968). 
18' State of Kansas ex. rel. Londerholm v. Anderson, 195 Kan. 649, 408 P.2d 864 
(1965). 
People ex rel. Brown v. Illinois State Trooper Lodge No. 41, 7 Ill. App. 3d 98, 286 
N.E.2d 524 (1972). 
283 State of Florida ex rel. Van Aartsen v. Barton, 93 So. 2d 388 (Fla. 1957). 
18' The statutory authority is CAL. CN. PROC. CODE 3 803 (West 1980). 
la' CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 11 $5 1-2 (1984). 
186 Id. a t  6. 
la7 Id. a t  8 8. 
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proach would expand and strengthen the attorney general's en- 
forcement efforts, yet it would protect the charitable organization 
from frivolous suits brought by a member of the public. Who 
would seek to be relators? Public spirited citizens or public inter- 
est law firms, one would hope. One hindrance to significant expan- 
sion of enforcement through this approach is the question of attor- 
ney's fees for the successful relator. The defendant charitable 
organization or its directors are an obvious source, but they may 
not have the financial resources. However, the financial situation of 
many nonprofits would make this kind of litigation unattractive to 
the aggressive, fee-seeking plaintifPs bar so active in the private 
A fund for the compensation of attorneys similar to those 
that exist in the criminal area might be created. The fund would 
be under the supervision of the attorney general. An expanded use 
of relators to enforce the responsibilities of charitable organiza- 
tions to the public would provide an appropriate balance between 
more effective regulation of charitable activities and the protection 
of nonprofits from nuisance litigation. 
C. Restructuring the Nonprofit Board 
1. The Need for an Effective Board of Directors 
Directors who do not direct are not unique to the nonprofit 
-Where there is an absence of even potential shareholder 
monitoring and an inadequacy of governmental oversight this 
problem assumes a special urgency, however. The figurehead direc- 
tor assumes an inactive role on the board, rarely attends meetings, 
and does not become involved in oversight responsibilities. Board 
members of nonprofits are sought for many reasons, including deep 
pockets, prestige within the community, contacts with prominant 
individuals or sources of funding, and general interest in the organ- 
izati~n.~~O Some nonprofit boards can be composed solely of token 
See Coffee, Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer 
as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215 (1983). 
See M. EISENBERG, TI-E STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 139, 139-44 (1976); M. 
MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY (1971); Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct, 47 
HARV. L. REV. 1305 (1934). 
Cf. Glueck, Power and Esthetics: The Trustee, ART I N  AMERICA, July-Aug., 1971, at 
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members controlled by in-house director employees. In contrast to 
directors of business corporations, nonprofit board members may 
have few other institutional, board, corporate, or legal exper- 
i e n c e ~ . ~ ~ ~  Often they have little sense of what is expected from 
them as a director. Nonprofit practices have been traditionally 
much looser than those of the business corporation. In the business 
corporation, there may be a greater sense of shared directorial ex- 
pectations. Information may be demanded from inside director- 
managers. Independent or outside directors may have a greater 
shared sense of what is proper behavior. Particularly in the public 
corporation, there may be reporting requirements which inculcate 
standard operating and reporting procedures. 
Other checks and balances ensure that business corporate boards 
fulfill their responsibilities. Shareholders have theoretical powers 
through election of directors,202 calling of special meetings, and re- 
moval of directors with or without cause.293 The threat of deriva- 
tive suits combined with an active plaintifF's bar encourages direc- 
torial responsibility. In the public corporation, the scrutiny of the 
financial press and the securities industry serves as a check. The 
filing requirements and the Securities and Exchange Commission's 
oversight responsibilities also insure oversight of the board.294 
78, reprinted in 2 J. MERRYMAN & A ELSEN, LAW, ETHICS AND THE VISUAL ARTS 7-60 to 7-63 
(1979). 
la' That business corporate directors and senior management share common business 
and professional backgrounds and live in the same social and economic milieu has been well 
documented. See Brudney, The Independent Director - Heavenly City or Potemkin Vil- 
lage, 95 HARV. L. REV. 597, 612-13, especially sources & nn.43-45 (1982); McAlmon, The 
Corporate Boardroom: A Closed Circle, Bus. & SOC'Y. REV., Winter 1974-1975, a t  64; Solo- 
mon, Restructuring the Corporate Board of Directors; Fond Hope-Faint Promise? 76 
MICH. L. REV. 581, 584-86 (1978). 
181 "Virtually all statutes provide that the directors of a business corporation shall be 
elected a t  annual or other periodic intervals by the shareholders." W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, 
supra note 253, a t  141. 
lag See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW 33 602-03, 706 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1984-85); DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 8, 3s 141(k), 211(c) (1983). Even potential shareholder power has been criti- 
cized. See Manning, Book Review, 67 YALE L.J. 1478 (1958) (reviewing J. A LMNGSTONE, 
THE AMERICAN STOCKHOLDER); Chayes, The Modern Corporation and the Rule of Law in 
THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 25 (E. Mason ed. 1959). 
la' Corporations that are registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission pur- 
suant to $ 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. $ 78 L (g)(l) (1983), must 
file monthly, quarterly, and annual reports, all of which are public documents. Stock ex- 
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2. The Need for Higher Standards of Conduct 
The conflicting origins of nonprofit corporation law have affected 
the way nonprofit organizations are administered and the stan- 
dards and fiduciary duties imposed upon those in charge.29B The 
trust and corporate law origins of nonprofit law come into conflict 
in defining the legal responsibilities of the boards of directors of 
nonprofit corporations.206 In recent years, nonprofit standards and 
patterns of governance have moved toward business corporate 
standards.207 Certainly, in matters of internal governance or corpo- 
rate housekeeping the move toward corporate rules is salutory. 
However, to apply a business corporate standard to all board mem- 
bers' actions and responsibilities in all kinds of nonprofits may be 
too lenient.298 This approach ignores the special public purposes 
and public trust of the nonprofit corporation, the nature of the 
nonprofit board, and the inadequacy of internal control and 
enforcement. 
There are few cases dealing with a director's standards of proper 
changes have disclosure requirements. The Proxy Solicitation and other reporting require- 
ments of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,15 U.S.C. §$ 78m, 7811 (West 1983), ensure a 
flow of available information. 
aos See infra notes 319-21 and accompanying text. 
208 Thus, the choice of organizational form - trust or nonprofit corporation - may 
determine which body of law will apply to the particular charity and the standards of con- 
duct of the director. Note, The Fiduciary Duties of Loyalty and Care Associated with Di- 
rectors and Trustees of Charitable organizations, 64 VA. L. REV. 449, 450 (1978). In the 
words of Professor Kenneth Karst: 
A distinction which gives such great weight to organizational form rather than 
operational need carries a substantial burden of justification, and as yet that bur- 
den has not been met . . . There is no good reason for making different rules for 
the managers of two large foundations simply because one is a corporation and the 
other a trust. The law should recognize that the charitable trust and the charita- 
ble corporation have more in common with each other than each has with its pri- 
vate counterpart. 
Karst, supra note 5, a t  436. 
Is' Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat'l Training School for Deaconesses and Missionaries, 
381 F. Supp. 1003,1013 (D.D.C. 1974) ("the modern trend is to apply corporate rather than 
trust principles in determining the liability of the directors of charitable corporations"); 
Hansmann, Reforming, supra note 6, a t  567-74. 
Ies Compare N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT COW. LAW § 715 (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1984-85) 
and N.Y. Bus. COW. LAW 3 717 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1984-85 ) with CAL. CORP. CODE 
309, 5231, 7231 (West 1977 & Supp. 1985). 
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conduct that apply to charitable corporations. One could suggest 
that the issue of which standard to apply-corporate or trust-is a 
theoretical question with but little practical import. Yet, higher, 
well-articulated standards of behavior will inform board members 
and will better produce expected and appropriate standards of be- 
havior. The basic problem in the nonprofit area is educational. De- 
velopment of appropriate standards of conduct must strike a fair 
balance between society's interest in the effectiveness with which 
charities accomplish their purposes and the need to avoid undue 
restrictions or burdensome procedures that make it difficult to re- 
cruit directors. 
The primary need for effective boards of directors results from 
the fact is that charities are largely self-reg~lated.~~~ The nature of 
the nonprofit form, particularly in non-membership corporations, 
leads to self-perpetuating boards with only theoretical accountabil- 
ity to the public through the attorney general.300 Some nonprofit 
corporations with members, such as mutual benefit ~orpora t ions~~l  
resemble stock corporations. Their members, like shareholders, 
have standing to monitor and enforce the board's fiduciary respon- 
sibilities. Religious corporations create special problems. Because 
of First Amendment requirements, attorneys general in most states 
are loath to monitor them closely.302 
Unlike business corporations, there is relatively little dispute re- 
garding the identity of those for whom nonprofit officers and direc- 
tors are trustees.303 Society has an interest in the proper adminis- 
tration of charities, and this interest is the same regardless of 
organizational form. Tax exemption provides charitable organiza- 
l g g  Abrams, supra note 3, at 485. 
See supra note 267. Under the New York statute members have standing to sue. 
N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 720 (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1984-85). However, in 
nonmembership corporations only directors and the attorney general have standing to sue. 
See supra text accompanying notes 249-51; CAL. CORP. CODE @j 7310-54 (West 
Supp. 1985). 
See supra notes 247-48. The rationalization that religious organization should be 
self-regulated lies not only with the restrictions placed on public oversight by the constitu- 
tional guarantees of freedom of religion, but also with the higher ethical norms expected 
from such organizations. 
Cf. Hansmann, Reforming, supra note 6, at 508-09; Elman, supra note 213, at 1010- 
12. 
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tions with specific benefits and substantial advantages.s04 The pub- 
lic has a justified expectation that nonprofits will be run efficiently 
and that they will fulfill the public purposes for which funds have 
been contributed or for which the government has granted them 
tax exemptions. The charitable sector's exemption from taxation is 
an expense borne by all taxpayers.s06 Nonprofits may be exempt 
from taxation, but they should not be exempt from the responsibil- 
ities that go with such benefits. 
A widespread perception of abuse by charities will affect the 
charitable sector generally and may lead to such congressional ac- 
tion as that which occurred in the legislative reform of private 
foundations in 1969.s0s High standards will serve as a model of di- 
rectorial behavior. Most directors want to do what is appropriate. 
The problem is that appropriate board behavior is an uncertain 
concept. Higher standards of conduct will create a unity of interest 
among the public, the organization, and the board, and will ensure 
that tax exempt monies will be expended for public purposes in 
SM See supra note 220. 
See A. FELD, M. O'HARE, & J. SCHUSTER, PATRONS DESPITE THEMSELVES: TAXPAYERS 
AND ARTS POLICY (1983); Simon, Charity and Dynasty Under the Federal Tax System, Yale 
Program on Nonprofit Organizations, Working Paper No. 5, a t  1 (1978). 
In 1969, as a result of perceived improper activities by private foundations, Con- 
gress enacted substantial sanctions on private foundations. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. 
No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (1970) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. 
(1982)). For the first time, "private foundation" was defined in I.R.C. 3 509(a) to mean 
every domestic or foreign charitable organization described in I.R.C. 501(c)(3), save for 
four categories referred to in I.R.C. $8 509(a)(1),(2), (3), and (4). Charitable organizations in 
I.R.C. 3 509(a) are divided into two classes - private foundations or public charities which 
obtain support from a broad segment of the public. The Tax Reform Act of 1969 also intro- 
duced into the Internal Revenue Code other sections affecting private foundations, includ- 
ing I.R.C. 3s  4940 (an excise tax based on investment income), 4941 (taxes on self-dealing 
transactions between a "disqualiied person" and 501(c)(3) organizations that are private 
foundations), 4942 (taxes for failure to distribute income) 4943 (taxes on excess business 
holdings), 4944 (taxes on investments which jeopardize charitable purposes), and 4945 
(taxes on taxable expenditures). The Tax Reform Act of 1969 introduced several provisions 
strengthening disclosure requirements. See I.R.C. $5 6065 (verification of returns), 6104 
(publicity of information requirement), 6652 (penalties for failure to file certain informa- 
tion), 6684 (certain assessable penalties equal to tax liability), and 6685 (assessable penalties 
relating to private foundation annual returns). The rationale behind Congress's actions can 
be found in STAFF OF JOINT COMMIT~EE ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION,GENERAL EXPLANA- 
TION OF THE TAX REFORM Am OF 1969,91st Cong., 2d Sess., 3-4,29-31,40-41,46-48 (Comm. 
Print 1970). See P. WUSCH & N. SUGARMAN, supra note 107, a t  269-87. 
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the most efficient way. ~ i ~ h  standards of conduct and increasing 
education of board members is one approach.307 The restructuring 
of the nonprofit board is another. 
3. Bifurcating the Nonprofit Board - The Board of Advisors 
and the Board of Director-Managers 
One way to improve oversight of nonprofit organizations and to 
encourage directorial responsibility would be to restructure the 
nonprofit board by bifurcating it  into a board of dire~tor~managers 
who would be responsible for day-to-day management of the or- 
ganization and a supervisory board of advisors charged with over- 
sight of the management board. 
A bifurcated board might recognize the disparate functions, ex- 
perience, and participation of nonprofit board members and pro- 
vide greater oversight. The Board of Advisors would owe primary 
fiduciary responsibilities to the public, to beneficiaries, and to pa- 
trons, but, unlike present directors, would not be directly con- 
. cerned with managing the nonprofit corporation. Advisors would 
not be employees or senior management of the nonprofit. 
Patrons and beneficiaries are often named to nonprofit boards. 
Under this bifurcated board proposal, these types of directors 
would serve on the Advisory Board. This approach would reflect 
these directors' lesser level of participation. Members of the Board 
of Advisors would be subject to a lesser standard of conduct than 
present directors. In compensation, the Board of Director-Manag- 
ers would be subject to higher standards. 
Under this proposal, the Board of Advisors could select and re- 
move the Board of Director-Managers, set their salaries, bring suit 
on behalf of the nonprofit corporation, and report annually to 
funding sources and beneficiaries on the financial situation of the 
This has been attempted by the Association of American Museums, which has spon- 
sored publications such as COMMITTEE ON ETHICS, MUSEUM ETHICS: A REPORT O THE AMERI- 
CAN ASSOCIATION P MUSEUMS (1978), and k ULLBERG & P. UUBERG, MUSE UP,^ 
TRUSTEESHIP (1981). The Metropolitan Museum of Art has published INFORMATION FOR
TRUSTEES (1978). However, smaller museums may not be members of the American Associa- 
tion of Museums and probably would not have the resources to publish guides for directors. 
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nonprofit. Its only participation in management responsibilities 
would arise if the Director-Managers desired to change the non- 
profit purposes of the organization. The Board of Advisors also 
might identify extraordinary problems faced by the organization, 
could call members' meetings and could authorize dissolution. 
This separation into a managing board and an advisory board is 
not without analogue in civil law systems or in the common law.808 
In a broad sense, the responsibilities of the Board of Advisors re- 
semble those of the indenture trustee, who protects a large number 
of widely dispersed bondholders and ensures that the debtors ful- 
fill their respon~ibilities.~~~ 
A more applicable example in American law is the unaffiliated 
director under Section 10(a) and 15(c) of the Investment Company 
Act of 1940.310 Section 10(a) requires that every investment com- 
pany have a board of directors of whom at  least forty percent are 
"disinterested." A "disinterested" individual is one who does not 
serve or have other interests in the management of the company.311 
Under Section 15(c) of the 1970 amendments to the act, the pri- 
mary responsibility of "the unaffiliated director" is to request and 
evaluate such information as may reasonably be necessary to eval- 
uate managerial contacts with outside investment advisors.812 Un- 
affiliated directors approve the distribution contract's valuation of 
non-listed securities and have the final responsibility for the ex- 
penditure of fund assets.s13 They look to the full time directors and 
officers for information and serve as watchdogs over shareholders' 
An American business corporate law example is the disinterested director's require- 
ment of Sections 10(a) and 15(c) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76- 
686,54 Stat. 789,806,813 (Codified as amended a t  15 U.S.C. 55 80a-10(a), 80 a 15(c)(1982)). 
Bifurcated boards are found in civil law systems such as France, Germany, Italy, The 
Netherlands, Sweden, and in Latin American countries. See Vagts, Reforming The Modern 
Corporation; Perspectives from the German, 80 HARV. L. REV. 23, 50 (1966). 
See Trust Indenture Act of 1939,15 U.S.C.A. $8 77jjj-77000,77qqq (1982). See I1 L. 
Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 720-43 (2nd ed. 1961). 
310 15 U.S.C. 53 80a-10(a), - 15(c) (1982). See Nutt, A Study of Mutual Fund Zndepen- 
dent Directors, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 179, 230-65 (1971); Jaretzki, Duties and Responsibilities 
of Directors of Mutual Funds, 29 LAW & CONTEMP. ROBS. 777 (1964). 
S1l 15 U.S.C. $5 80a-2(19), 10(a) (1982). 
=12 15 U.S.C. 5 80a-15(c) (1982). 
Nutt, supra note 310, a t  195, 231-32. 
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interests. There are weaknesses with the unaffiliated director ap- 
proach,314 yet the concept that a group of disinterested outsiders 
may best evaluate the performance of those managing a corpora- 
tion and protect a broad constituency is a useful approach for non- 
profit governance. 
The German experience provides another helpful example of the 
bifurcated board.316 The day-to-day conduct of a German corpora- 
tion's business is in the hands of a managing board. Its members, 
analogous to a business corporation's inside directors, formulate 
corporate policy and conduct ongoing corporate business.316 A Su- 
pervisory Council is created for the sole purpose of overseeing 
management. Unlike the American outside director, members of 
the German supervisory board have no statutory responsibility for 
the management of the ~orporation.~'~ Active participation in man- 
agement decisions is rare. Staying clear of day-to-day business, the 
Supervisory Council monitors the performance of the Managing 
Board, and reports to the shareholders. It examines the annual re- 
port of the Managing Board after it has been audited, and reports 
on the results of its examination at the annual shareholders' meet- 
' ing.318 The Supervisory Board appoints and can remove members 
Among the criticisms are that investment advisors have hand-picked new directors 
and that meetings of the board were perfunctory. Id. a t  216, 220-22. 
316 See Vagts, supra note 308, a t  48-53; Berger, Shareholder Rights under the German 
Stock Corporation Law of 1965, 38 FORDHAM L. REV. 687 (1970); Roth, Superuision of Cor- 
porate Management: The "Outside" Director and the German Experience, 51 N.C.L. REV. 
1369 (1973); Vagts, The European System, 27 Bus. LAW. 165 (1972). 
Berger, supra note 308, a t  691-95; Vagts, supra note 308, a t  50. 
Under American corporate principles, the business responsibility is imposed on 
both officers and members of the board of directors. See DEL. CODE. ANN., tit. 8, 3 141(a) 
(1974). In the larger corporation, the management function is normally vested in the princi- 
ple senior executives. The board of directors selects the senior officers and oversees their 
performance. A.L.I:, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 3 3.02 comment (Tent. Draft. 
No. 2, 1984). Board committees may have outside director compensation but the ultimate 
responsibility over all managerial decisions is invested in the board as a group. It is sug- 
gested that the inside and outside directors will have a "watchful but supportive relation- 
ship," but the use and impact of independent directors has been criticized. Brudney, supra 
note 291,616-20,638-39,651-52; Solomon, supra note 291, a t  610. Under this proposal, the 
bifurcated board may create a more adversarial relationship, difficult if not unrealistic on 
the corporate board. See Brudney, supra note 291, a t  610-12. 
Berger, supra note 315, a t  696-97; Roth, supra note 315, a t  1371. Under the German 
statute the standards of conduct of members of the Managing Board and the Supervisory 
Council are the same. Vagts, Reforming the Modern Corporation, supra note 308, a t  52. But 
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of the Managing Board, negotiates compensation of the managers, 
and brings suit on behalf of the corporation. 
The Board of Advisors might work in the following way in the 
nonprofit corporation. If the nonprofit were a membership corpora- 
tion, the members would select the initial Board of Advisors. 
Thereafter, the Board of Advisors would select its successors, who 
would be removable by the members. For non-membership non- 
profits, the Managing Board would select the initial Advisory 
Board, who would thereafter choose their successors and replace- 
ments.There are pitfalls and problems, as the German experience 
indicates. German Supervisory Councils have been controlled by , 
special interests.319 In practice it may be difficult to separate the 
functions of the Management Board and the Advisory Board. 
When the shares of a German corporation are concentrated in a 
few hands, the dominant shareholders control the management 
and supervisory boards. If the shares are widely held, the manag- 
ing board gains the upper hand.320 This may occur with the non- 
profit board, but the Board of Advisors may be more effective be- 
cause the primary responsibility of reporting will be to patrons 
who may be less docile than shareholders and have more influence 
- the power of the purse. 
The role of special interest groups - workers, representatives of 
bank concerns, suppliers, and large consumers - has been cited as 
a failing of the German approach.321 These groups are inherently a t  
odds. We believe that the nonprofit interests on the board, includ- 
ing most funding sources, do not have the same stake in the organ- 
ization as the German representatives and have less reason for 
deep disagreement and divisiveness. The Supervisory Councils 
see Vagts, supra note 315, at 168 (suggesting that although the Supervisery Board's stan- 
dard of conduct is essentially the same as the Managing Board's the former's duties are 
actually more limited). 
318 Vagts, supra note 308, at 50-52. Some of the members of the German Supervisory 
Council are selected by the shareholders; others by workers. Representatives of banks and 
suppliers may be on the Council. German corporations are often controlled by a few large 
banks because shareholders deposit their certificates with banks who vote the shares and 
have usurped the shareholders' function. Roth, supra note 315, at 1378-79. 
Vagts, supra note 308, at 52; Roth, supra note 315, at 1378-81. 
921 Vagts, supra note 308, at 52-53. 
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have few meetings and the problem of outside directors in ob- 
taining information is similar to our system. 
One observer has noted that the German approach plays its 
most useful role in identifying dficulties on the horizon faster 
than the typical board, which is wrapped up in day-to-day man- 
agement. Inefficient management thus can be replaced faster.322 
The bifurcated board may provide additional oversight to ensure 
that charities are fulfilling their responsibilities to the public. It 
may reduce impermissible self-dealing and will encourage directors 
and supervisors to devote a reasonable amount of time to their du- 
ties. The Advisory Board will be able to focus more upon long 
range goals and planning. It will obviate the need for more restric- 
tive government regulation and will ensure the organization's com- 
pliance with legal requirements. 
Despite possible problems, a bifurcated board would more realis- 
tically reflect the actual practice in nonprofit board governance. It 
would promote voluntarism without the great commitment and po- 
tential legal liabilities that board members fear. It might improve 
the lack of regulation and monitoring of nonprofit organizations. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Nonprofit corporation law has developed as an afterthought to 
business corporation law and without an appreciation of the com- 
plexity and diversity of the charitable sector. We have offered sev- 
eral suggestions for reform of nonprofit corporation law which, we 
believe, will better reflect the diversity of the nonprofit sector and 
meet the needs of charitable corporations. Whichever way non- 
profit corporation law evolves, attention must be given to the reali- 
ties of nonprofit corporation governance and the development of 
alternative approaches to the effective monitoring of nonprofits' 
performance. Nonprofit corporation law should be more than the 
"hand me down" of business corporation law. 
Vagts, supra note 315, at 170. 
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